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BARR Survey Report

Building Assessments and Rubble Removal in Quake-Affected Neighborhoods in Haiti

**BARR Survey
Final Report**

LTL Strategies

by

Timothy T Schwartz

with

**Yves-François Pierre
Eric Calpas**

April 23, 2011

This technical proposal was produced for review by the
United States Agency for International Development

It was prepared by **LTL Strategies** (www.ltlstrategies.com)

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DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government

A note regarding the sample and techniques used for estimating population parameters

Estimates given in this report are derived from sampling one part of the Port-au-Prince population (population ~ 2 million) and extrapolating the statistics to the total population of earthquake impacted region (population ~ 3 million).

To accomplish this, the estimates are conditioned by the proportion of red, yellow and green houses in the sampled versus the total region. In effect, statistics such as 'household absentees,' are calculated per color coded house category. The proportion in the sample is then adjusted for the proportion of red houses in the total population to arrive at an estimation of, using the example cited, 'total number of absentees; in the entire strike region.

However, because the entire region was not sampled the estimates cannot, in a strict theoretical sense, be considered a statistically representative application of the data. Some areas were omitted from the sample frame: specifically, outlying areas (Carrefour, Gressier, Leogane, Ti Goave, Mirgoanes, Jacmel) and areas of low impact and low levels of destruction (Cite Soley, Kenskoff, and upper Petion Ville).

Summary of Significant Findings

- Rubble Removal programs made it possible for an estimated 179,197 to 290,394 people (comprising 34,461 to 55,845 resident units) to return to their green and yellow color coded homes ($p < .01$)
- MTPTC Green, Yellow, and Red building structural evaluations had no detectable impact on home returns
- An estimated 73,846 of greater Port-au-Prince's 115,384 buildings marked red-- indicating they should be demolished—have been re-inhabited
- Unless the GOH is going to move people out of Red buildings and then demolish the buildings, the amount of rubble that must be cleared, based on Miyamoto and Gilani's (2011) estimate using red houses, can be modified from 8.8 to 3.68 million cubic meters, 15% of the original 20 to 25 million cubic meters that the US Army Corps of Engineers estimated in February 2010
- The number of fatalities that resulted from the earthquake is estimated at 46,190 to 84,961 ($p < .01$), approximately 2.2% of the population
- Estimated number of people who went to camps in January 2010 is 866,412 to 894,588 ($p < .01$)
- By April approximately half of those people who had gone to camps or the countryside had returned home; today, accounting for the dead (~2.2%), all but an estimated 13.8% of the pre January 12th 2010 population have returned to their homes
- The current number of IDPs, meaning people who have not returned to their earthquake impacted home, is estimated to be 141,158 to 375,031 ($p < .01$)
- The estimate for those IDPs who are currently living in camps and who are indeed from earthquake impacted homes is 15% of total IDPs or 18,690 to 66,62 people ($p < .01\%$)

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1 Introduction

On January 12, 2010, Haiti was struck by a magnitude 7.3 earthquake. An estimated 3 million people were impacted, and original estimates were that 50 to 80% percent of all residential and commercial buildings in the capital and surrounding areas were destroyed or severely damaged, 217,000 to 300,000 people killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.5 million people homeless.

Despite a massive international response with an emphasis on housing and shelter, OCHA and OIM estimated that as of January 12th 2011, one year after the earthquake, 810,000 people-- 30% of the metropolitan population--still remained displaced and living in Camps (findings in this report as well as findings of the MTPTC color coded building program suggest this as well as most of the other estimates cited are improbable figures).

To assist and encourage people to return to their homes, USAID funded Rubble Removal Programs including demolition of condemned buildings and the removal of rubble from streets and drainage canals. Between February 2010 and February of this year USAID also supported the Ministry of Public Works Transport and Communications (MTPTC) habitability assessments program in which buildings were structurally evaluated and color-coded green (for safe to return), yellow (unsafe to inhabit but reparable), and red (for unsafe to enter/damaged beyond repair). The precise impact of rubble removal and the assessments on IDP returns was, prior to the current study, unknown.

To determine the contribution the programs made, USAID contracted LTL Strategies to conduct the Building Assessments and Rubble Removal surveys (here on referred to as BARR). The principal objective was to calculate, to a relatively high degree of accuracy and with a reasonably high degree of statistical probability, the impact on rate of re-occupancy of MTPTC assessments and rubble removal on IDP returns.

Hypotheses,

1. The program of habitability assessment encouraged the return home of IDPs
2. The rubble removal program encouraged the return home of IDPs

The survey also presented an opportunity to resolve issues important to the reconstruction and housing effort as discussed and highlighted by participants in the October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter. Specifically, obstacles to home return; re-occupancy rates of yellow and red buildings; occupant knowledge of damages and capacity to repair homes; and tenure issues (ownership of house and land, confidence in land tenure security).

BARR included,

- A pilot study in Ravine Pentad: a comprehensive survey of MTPTC color coded buildings versus home occupancy for all Ravine Pentad residential buildings; an application of the BARR residential building questionnaire to all of those that were color coded green and yellow (prior to the survey the number was thought to be 221 buildings)

- a 55 cluster and 3,784 residential building survey of Port-au-Prince neighborhoods severely impacted by the earthquake; application of the BARR residential building questionnaire to one owner or renter in approximately half of those buildings (1,928)

This report focuses on the Port-au-Prince Cluster sample.

- 3 million people in impacted area (USGS; OCHA; Red Cross)¹
- 217,000-316,000 killed (PADF, GOH, OCHA)
- 300,000 injured (GOH)
- 1.500,000 Internally displaced (without homes)
- 1,000,000 in camps (OCHA; IOM)
- 810,000 in camps as of Jan 12th 2011 (OCHA; IOM)
- 510,000 to 570,000 go to countryside (OCHA; Colombia University and Karolinska Institute)

Text Box A: MTPTC




In collaboration with Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Communication (MTPTC), UN's Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), Miyamoto International trained 270 Haitian engineers in building assessment techniques. The engineers evaluated and then "tagged" buildings using a color-coded system

Green = safe
Yellow = inhabit after repairs
Red = unsafe for occupancy

Source: PADF Website

Over the period of February 2010 to January 2011 the engineers evaluated 382,256 Port-au-Prince homes. They marked 205,539 green (54%), 99,043 yellow (26%), and 77,674 red (20%).

Figure 1: MTPTC Coded Houses in P-au-P



The project is generally considered among the best managed post earthquake undertakings. Dr. Kit Miyamoto, President of Miyamoto International, summed up the associated enthusiasm when he concluded that, "These assessments will shape the future of Port-au-Prince's rebuilding efforts. We now know with certainty the condition of homes, where they are and what repairs are needed" (PADF Webpage).

The BARR survey found that people indeed appreciated the assessments. Many respondents said that they were encouraged to return home because of them (MTPTC section). However, when we broke responses down and compared them to behavior there was no evidence that people in fact did return home because of the surveys. More ominously, the vast majority of the sixty-four percent of buildings marked red—for condemned—and on the property of which people are once again living have, in fact, been re-inhabited (see Section 4.3: Re-occupancy Rate).

2 Methodology: Port-au-Prince Cluster Sample Survey

The original BARR survey was designed to be a 3,600 building survey of Port-au-Prince neighborhoods stratified to compare sites of intensive rubble removal to those where rubble removal had not yet occurred. This ‘treatment vs. control’ strategy was dropped during analysis because there were little to no significant differences between the two groups (see Annex) In adapting to deadlines (data was originally intended to be collected before the January 12th 2011 anniversary of the tragedy), violence surrounding the elections (the survey overlapped with the presidential campaign and elections), and limited sampling frame (sites selected from the Rubble Removal lists were limited and often overlapped), the actual size of the survey was larger than planned. Specifically, BARR sampled 55 clusters, 3,784 buildings, 5,158 residences.

Significant components of the research design were the following,

- treatment sites (clusters) were selected randomly from lists provided by organizations that have been part of the USAID funded rubble removal program (34 sites/cluster with 50 buildings per site, n = 1,700)
- control sites (clusters) were selected randomly and systematically using a grid pattern laid over a map of the principal contiguous urban portion of Port-au-Prince (21 sites/clusters with 100 buildings per site, n=2,084)
- a cluster was defined as the 50 (or 100) houses closest to a selected geographical point (located by latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates; see Methodology section in Annex for complete explanation)
- basic demographic data was collected for all 5,158 residences (missing = 23; note that there were often multiple residences per building; specifically, 1.36 residences per building)
- a questionnaire focusing on rubble removal, MTPTC house evaluations, attitudes toward repairs, and other variables of interest was applied to one resident in approximately every second building (a total of 1,928 questionnaires)

The survey design, preparation, training, execution, data entry and analysis spanned a period of 6 months, from September 2010 to February 2011. The actual data gathering took 29 days, involved 1 team leader, 1 qualitative specialist who oversaw field work and key informant interviews, 2 supervisors who managed two teams of 5 interviewers per team (10 interviewers), four vehicles and drivers, and 3 fulltime data entry personnel.

- 1 Survey Expert and Team Leader
- 1 Local Quantitative & Qualitative Expert
- 2 Supervisors
- 10 Junior Investigators
- 3 Data entry personnel
- 4 Drivers


- 3,784 buildings red, yellow and green
- 5,158 residences (1.36 residences per bldg)
- 1,928 in depth questionnaires 55 clusters
- 29 days collecting data

[for more information on the Methodology section in Appendix]

Text Box B: Survey Teams, Field Work, and Data Entry

The selected points were located on the ground using maps and hand held GPS devices. Once located, we selected the designated number of buildings closest to the selected GIS point. Under the guidance of the 2 supervisors, two teams of 5 surveyors each (total = 10). They visited two clusters each per day, 4 clusters total, for a total of 100 to 200 buildings per day. Data Entry was entered daily and we entered it twice to control for errors. The survey field work spanned 29 days; complete with data entry and data re-entry the survey spanned 37 days.


Figure 2: Survey



Surveyors (left to right): Guy Emmanuel Pavilus, Sherley Paul, Fertil Schneider, Gustave Jean Luquel, Daniel Marie Genite, Hedelle Etienne, Olibrice Carmel, Karl-Edouard Joseph, Deborah Etienne, Bruno Jean Thony, Paul Andre Rene, Vena Decelui Mogene, Jacob Michel

Figure 3: Delmas 32 (T7)

18°32'41.80"N 72°18'23.57"W



Surveyors used maps, photos, and handheld GPS devices to locate sample points.

Figure 4: Planning



Team Co-Leader and qualitative data analysis Yves Francois Pierre reviews maps and GPS points with surveyors.

Figure 5: Data Entry Team




Gertude Gilles, left, Kendy Pierre, center, Martine Delisca, right,

3 Respondents and Community


Respondent profiles reflected the target respondent being owner-residents of the household: Sixty-eight percent were building owners (note that this does not necessarily mean that a equal proportion of the population are owners). Fifty-eight percent of respondents were female, 42% were male; and the median age of respondents was 35 years old.

Figure 6: Respondents by Gender




n = 1,928, Missing = 0

Figure 7: Age of Respondents



n = 1,928, n = 34

Figure 8: Land Tenure Status of Respondents



n = 1,928, n = 1


Employment and economic endeavors were typical of popular Haitian neighborhoods: More than half of all female household heads were engaged in selling; 26% said that they had no economic occupation; 18% were domestics, cooks, clerks or professions. Males were overwhelmingly skilled and unskilled laborers and taxi drivers (45%); teachers, policemen, or government officials (18%), with 21% reporting no occupation.

Figure 9: Occupation Female Household Head



n = 1,928, Missing = 390


Figure 10: Occupation Male Household Head



n = 1,928, Missing = 564


Significant with respect to occupation and economic livelihood strategies is that 20% of all residences reported selling or producing something out of the home (Figure 12). Of these 48% were small convenience stores with food staples, rum, and hygienic products; 9% were sale of potable water, 39% fell into the category of other which typically indicated specialization in one or a few commodities; four percent were seamstresses (Figure 13).

Figure 12: Residences with Business



n = 1,928, Missing = 0


Figure 13: Types of Business in the Residence



n = 404, Missing = 0


Although clearly business minded, people living in the popular neighborhoods are overwhelmingly oriented not toward trade unions and political organizations, but to religions and educational institutions: 63% of respondents reported attending religious meetings and 45% attend meetings associated with schools compared to 18% with community groups, 12% with cooperatives, and a mere 7% who attend political meetings.

Figure 14: Organizational Affiliation



n = 1,928, Missing = 17

Figure 15: Years Living in the Neighborhood



n = 1,928, Missing = 34

The length of time that respondents have lived in the neighborhood reveals a notable degree of stability. Port-au-Prince is young. Today a city of 2 million, in 1950 it had a population of less than 150,000 residents. At that time the sprawling neighborhoods of cement and tin that we see today were mostly sugar cane fields and thickets. But despite its youth, residential stability in the city is remarkable. The average respondent reported having lived in the same neighborhood for 17 years--twice the 8

year average for United States citizens (Figure 15). Moreover, the fact that we know, apart from the survey, that many residences are newly arrived in-migrants from the countryside suggests that urban residential stability is even greater than it appears. This observation offers insight not just with respect to geographic mobility, it also tells us something about social mobility in Port-au-Prince. There has long been a trend in the city for people to move up the hill toward Petion Ville, and in the past two decades even higher still to La Boule, Thomassin and Kenskoff. Yet, among those left behind residential stability is high and by corollary social and economic mobility low.¹

Reflecting geographic stability, people in the neighborhoods make investments in permanent cement housing and they seek to own the homes: 100% have cement floors (Figure 17), 99% have cement walls (Figure 16), and 62% have cement roofs (Figure 18). The typical building is one story (Figure 20) has two to four rooms (Figure 19). Fully 70% of those interviewed believe they own the house and 60% believe they own the land (see Figure 21 on the following page).

Figure 16: Wall Construction




Figure 19: Number of Rooms




Figure 17: Floor Construction




Figure 20: Number of Stories





Figure 18: Roof Construction



Text Box C: Land Insecurity?

“Formality/informality is often confused with security/insecurity.”

Laksa and El-Mikawy 2009

Haitian history is marked by what can be conceptualized as a long class war of attrition with the battle lines drawn at the trench between formal and informal land tenure systems. It began with thirteen years of bloody struggle for independence during rich white planters, rich black and mulatto planters, poor whites and a large block of miserable and fed-up rebelling slaves fought one another and occasionally joined forces to defeat armies from all three of Europe's major colonial powers (France, Britain, and Spain). But for many them it was not, as has often been portrayed, a unidirectional charge for the light of freedom at the end of a dark tunnel of repression. For most of the revolutionary years, most of the slaves stayed on the plantations. Somewhat bewildered, they tended crops and waited to see what would come of it all. They watched as planters fled, came back, fled again, and eventually didn't return at all. In the end they gained far more than the original rebels had ever dreamed they could obtain: Freedom and access to agricultural land to produce food crops (the original rebel leaders had offered to surrender in exchange for an extra day of freedom to tend their food plots and trade in markets). This is not to downplay the military role of the ex-slaves. It was an unquestionable victory fought and won in no small part by them. But, it was not, so to speak, black and white. It was the victory of not one but two revolutions: Two revolutions intrinsically opposed to one another. On the other hand were the masses of ex slaves who wanted nothing more than to be free to work small garden plots and to sell their foodstuffs and handcrafted goods in open the air markets. On the other hand were the mulattoes and black elite who had been free before the revolution and who wanted nothing more than be free and equal to the white planters so to pursue prosperity, including forcing the masses back to the plantations, if not as slaves, then as serfs (as set down in the Rural Code of 1825). But after independence the former slaves were loath to return to being workers on someone else's property. Ernest and bloody attempts to take land away from them and force them to work ultimately failed. To generate tax revenue for the ailing State, Haitian leaders were increasingly compelled to give land to soldiers and eventually to those peons who had not already seized land. By 1842 there was no turning back. The world's greatest plantation economy was becoming a country dominated by small peasant plots, a country that was to come to have as equitable a distribution of land as any on earth. Struggles and frequent warfare between the peasants--who had informal title to the land--and the foreign governments and elites--who used the formal legal system to make timber and mining concessions to multinational corporations--punctuated the next 100 years of history. The informal system prevailed. A thriving land market of small parcels evolved. The 1971 census found that there were 616,700 farms in Haiti (pop 4.1 million). Average holding was 1.4 hectares. Holdings typically consisted of several plots. The largest farms made up only 3 percent of the total number and comprised less than 20 percent of the total land. The 1950 census found that 85 percent of farmers owned their land (see Haggerty 1989). As urbanization took hold and rural immigrants increasingly moved into Port-au-Prince the process was repeated. Like their revolutionary forbearers, custodians of land owned by people who had fled into political asylum or gone to work overseas soon began to sell access to the land to rural in-migrants. Places like Ravine Pentad and Martissant—subjects of the BARR survey--began this way. With political turmoil that followed the fall of the 1986 Duvalier dictatorship, the process accelerated. A striking feature of the process is the large number of people who were able to own their own home and the permanence and sense of security with which the informal system is imbued. The BARR surveyors found that 70% of respondents claimed to own the house, 60% claimed to own the land, 93% of these had some kind of paper (see Figure 21). Only 28% of owners felt insecure about their property rights (see Figure 22).ⁱⁱ

Figure 21 House & Land Ownership





Figure 22: Land tenure Security




4 The earthquake

4.1 Where People Fled

When the earthquake struck, much of the Port-au-Prince population evacuated their cement homes. Spontaneous tent cities appeared throughout the metropolitan areas. Many of those who did not move to camps slept in the street, yards, or left the city altogether, returning to rural homesteads of origin.

Figure 23: Where People Fled (BARR)




n=1,928, Missing = 26

4.2 Needs in the Weeks following the Earthquake

BARR respondents reported their most immediate problems in the weeks that followed the earthquake were water, food, electricity, and a place to sleep. Twenty-four percent also mentioned “other” by which almost all meant stress and medical care. Crime, debris in the streets and yards, and latrines were cited much less frequently (Figure 24)

Figure 24: Most Acute Problems after the Earthquake




n=1,928, Missing = 2

4.3 Re-occupancy Rate

Knowledge regarding the precise number of people who stayed home, went to the province, to the camps or to the street as well when they returned home was, before the BARR survey, almost entirely speculative. The best, and for the most part only estimates for any movements came from United Nations OCHA, which estimated migration from Port-au-Prince to the provinces in the month following the earthquake; and Colombia University and Karolinska Institute’s analysis of Digicel cellular phone data for the 1st of December 2009 until June 11th 2011 (Figure 25). OCHA reported 511,405 people migrating to the provinces; the Digicel data indicated 570,000 people had fled to the provinces. Both figures support the BARR estimate of 525,000 extrapolated from the total sample (the range of the BARR estimate is 465,246 to 584,754 at $p < .01$). The Digicel data also corroborates the reverse flow as migrants began returning to Port-au-Prince at the beginning of February 2011 (Figure 26).ⁱⁱⁱ


Figure 25: Digicel Data: Port-au-Prince to the Provinces Migration Dec 2010 to June 2011



Source: Colombia University and Karolinska Institute, May and June 2010

BARR data shows people returning to their homes—from all destinations—as early as January. And echoing the Digicel findings; by June more than half were back home.

Figure 26: Returns by Month (BARR)



[Note: Based on 2nd half of BARR: N = 925; of which 585 reported were returnees who had left home]

Text Box D: Why People Went to Camps; and Why they Left?

When the earthquake struck 68% of people living in popular neighborhoods left their homes: 6% went to the homes of others, 14% moved into the yard or the street in front of their home, 18% went to the provinces, and 30% concentrated in camps with dozens, hundreds and sometimes thousands of other people. Perhaps for the workers in relief organizations that were delivering food, water, tarps, tents, setting up latrines, and giving medical care, it may have been obvious why so many people went to camps: they were in desperate need of help. But to get a sense of the order of priorities, the BARR survey asked people to give us the top three reasons why they went to camps: 88% said that they went because they were afraid of another earthquake. Less than half mentioned services, rubble, or crime, and 16% or less specifically mentioned water, food, electricity or access to latrines.

Figure 27: The Top Three Reasons People Gave for Going to Camps





Figure 28: The Top Three Reasons that People gave for Leaving Camps



We also asked people *why* they left the camps. Over 60% mentioned filth, chaos and noise. Crime and insecurity-- by which many people meant not so much crime as conflict with neighbors-- was third. Mosquitoes were an issue as was heat. As Kit Miyamoto said, "People don't want to live in these tents."

4.4 Current Occupancy Levels

By the time of the BARR survey (December 17th 2010 until January 29th 2011), home occupancy rates approached those of pre-earthquake levels. The way BARR surveyors measured home occupancy was ‘if the family was sleeping on the property at nights.’ This could mean that they did not sleep in the house but rather in a tent or improvised shelter erected on the property. It is, however, clear from the scarcity of tents and improvised shelters in yards that the vast bulk of these people are in fact living in the homes. Figure 29 shows a total occupancy rate of 85% compared to a residence occupancy rate of 97% before the earthquake.

Figure 29:
Pre-Earthquake vs Current Occupancy Levels





Figure 30:
Pre The earthquake vs Current BARR




n = 5,110 Missing = 48

The inverse of the re-occupancy rate is that 16% of the total residents in the BARR sample have not returned home (Figure 30 left). Subtracting those that died as a result of the earthquake (2.2%: see section on Demography), 13.8% of people have not returned.

The most useful way to summarize and understand re-occupancy rates in light of the destruction of buildings is residences occupied per color coded buildings. Figure 31 on the right illustrates that at 96% occupation rate; Green houses are only one percent short of pre-earthquake occupation level of 97%; Yellow houses are 5% sort of pre-occupation levels; and striking revelation that should cause decision makers to pause and reconsider the direction and priorities of the reconstruction effort is that 64% of Red buildings have been re-occupied.

Figure 31:
Current Occupancy Levels per Residence per MTPTC Color Code



n = 5,158 Missing = 23

Text Box E: Changes in Household Size

BARR found that the average household size before the earthquake was 5.2 persons per household, typical for what social researchers find throughout the island--in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and in both rural and urban areas. Average household size for all homes, household size fell from pre-quake level of 5.02 to a January 2011 level of 4.19 persons per residence (Figure 32).

Figure 32:
Household Size for all Houses






Figure 33: Household Size with
Unoccupied and Destroyed
Houses Excluded



The above calculation includes unoccupied residences. But if we look at the issue in terms of real persons per household, meaning eliminating all unoccupied households--both before the earthquake and in the BARR sample--the number of persons per occupied household went from was 5.2 to 4.9 at the time of the BARR survey (Figure 33).


Figure 34: Change in Household Size



Another way to think about this is in terms of decline in household size. Figure 34 shows the overall decline of .83 persons per household, or 16.5%, for all houses totaled; and .28 persons or 5.4%, per household for occupied houses. These absentees can be thought of as those members who have not returned home or who died in the earthquake (Figure 35).


With the preceding in mind, a tool that we use later in this report to gain insight into demographic trends that came with and after the earthquake is to examine changes in household sizes for color coded categories (or more specifically, categorized degrees of earthquake impacted homes).

Figure 35: Pre-The earthquake vs. Present
Household Size per Household Color Category



n = 5158 Missing = 23

Figure 36: Difference in Pre-The earthquake
vs. Present Household Size



n = 5158 Missing = 23

5 Rubble

Among the most significant contributions the international community has made to home returns is removing rubble from the street, making it possible for many residents to remove rubble from their yards. Put another way, many people could remove rubble from their yards and dispose of it in the street only if someone was carting the rubble away for them. In testing this hypothesis, BARR focused only on returns to habitable buildings—Green and Yellow buildings. Red buildings were omitted from the study because, under MTPTC guidelines, they are unsafe for habitation (see Text Box A).

BARR found that for many residents rubble was indeed an obstacle to returning home. Figure 37 illustrates that 39% of all the Green and Yellow buildings had or still have at least some rubble in their yard. Over half of those respondents who had already removed rubble (63%) qualified the amount as having been “very significant” to “severe” (Figure 38 below). For those cases where rubble remained in the yard, surveyors described 59% of cases as “very significant” to “severe” (Figure 39 below). Corroborating the importance of removing Rubble, 55% of those respondents who had Rubble in their yards said that they could not have returned home if the rubble was not first removed (Figure 40 below); 58% of respondents reported that they could only remove the rubble from the yard if someone was removing it from the street (ibid).

Figure 37: Percentage of Residences that Had or Still Have Rubble in the Yard




Figure 38: Residences that Had Rubble in the Yard




Figure 39: Residences that Still Have Rubble in the Yard





Figure 40: Rubble as an Obstacle




[Note: Based on 2nd half of BARR: N = 925, of which 230 have or had rubble in the yard]

5.1 Importance of Removal

Congruent with Rubble being an obstacle to home returns, respondents did indeed see rubble removal as an important endeavor. On a scale of one to five, approximately one half of all respondents qualified Rubble Removal from the yard, and from the street as “very important” to “extremely important” to them and to the other residents of the household; an equivalent proportion of respondents said the same regarding the importance of Rubble removal to the general population.

Figure 41: Opinions on the Importance of Rubble Removal




5.2 Who Removed the Rubble

In 76% of the cases it was the owner who principally took on the task of removing rubble from the yards (Figure 42); for the 452 (23% of the total respondents) who removed rubble from their yard, the average cost was US \$323.59. The importance of removing Rubble from the street is echoed in Figure 43 in which it can be seen that 69% of all respondents who had to remove rubble from their yard disposed of it in the street.

Figure 42: Who Cleared Rubble from Yard




Figure 43: Where Rubble was Disposed



Regarding who people *thought* removed rubble from the street: Figure 44 illustrates that half (49%) did not know; 33% chose “other,” by which they meant other NGOs that have had a significant presence in rubble removal—such as J/P—or the government’s CNE. Only 15% mentioned USAID or one of the USAID partners in rubble clearing programs (Chemonics, CHF, OIM, and DAI).

Figure 44: What Organization People Believed Cleared Street Rubble




5.3 The Measurable Impact of Rubble Removal on Rate of Home Returns

To what degree did USAID and other Rubble Removal programs aid residents of Green and Yellow houses return home? The answer comes down to this: USAID and agencies engaged in Rubble Removal can take credit for having made home return possible only for those residents who meet the following criteria,


(A) Could only return home after the rubble and debris in the yard had been removed:

17% of respondents fell into this category (see Figure 45).^{iv}

(A) Figure 45: Proportion of Residents who Could only Return After Rubble had been Removed



(B) Figure 46: Elimination of People who Did Not Dispose of Rubble in the Street (percentages are for total N=1,928)



B) Did not cart Rubble off by truck or dispose of it in ravines, holes, and river beds (69% of 750 respondents who had to dispose of rubble). When we remove these people from the pool of “assisted population,” the proportion of people who could not otherwise have returned home, falls to 11 percent of total respondents. Figure 46 illustrates the relationship with a Ven Diagram.

(C) Those people who said that Rubble had to be removed before they could return home but in fact returned home before the rubble was removed must be eliminated from the yard. Put another way, no matter what people said, we can only take credit for people who did in fact return home only after Rubble was removed from their yard. In Figure 47 we see that 90% of those in Figure 46 qualify (see also Figure 48). Of total respondents, 10% qualify. Using proportional probability we can extrapolate this to the larger population and calculate the c.i. for this estimate (see following page).

(C) Figure 47: Elimination of People Who Really came Home Before Rubble was Removed






Figure 48: Those Who Meet all Criteria of being “Assisted”: Came Home After vs Before Rubble Removed



Proportion of people who meet all criteria
 $\frac{92}{925} = 10\%$

5.4 Summary

- People see Rubble Removal as an Important activity
- USAID and organizations that removed rubble from the streets can claim to have aided those people who meet the following criteria,
 - could not return home if the rubble was not removed,
 - could not have removed rubble from the yard if it was not removed from the street,
 - in fact did not return home until after the rubble was removed
- Using the BARR data to calculate the estimated Population $92/925 =$ (Red houses were subtracted from the estimated total residences) =

$$\begin{aligned} & 10\% \pm 2.1\% \\ & = \underline{34,461 \text{ to } 55,845 \text{ resident units}} \\ & (p < .01) \end{aligned}$$

Text Box F: How Much Rubble is out there?

In February 2010 the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) used satellite imagery to estimate that there was 20 to 25 million cubic yards of rubble in Port-au-Prince. More recently UNOPS estimated that there was less than half that figure: 10.7 million cubic meters of rubble. Even more recently Miyamoto and Gilani brought the estimate of total rubble down to 8.8 million cubic meters. The way they did this was by calculating total rubble based on red houses: Because red houses are the rubble.

“It is assumed that all red-tagged buildings, regardless of the damage level, would need to be demolished, because currently there is no technical platform by MTPTC to repair red-tagged structures”.

Now, unless someone is going to remove people from the 64% of Red buildings that have been re-occupied, we can cut that figure by two thirds, to 3.168 million cubic meters.

(Unoccupied Red Buildings) x (Total Rubble from all Red buildings) = Real Amount of Rubble

$$(.36 \text{ occupied buildings}) \times (8.8 \text{ million M}^3) = 3.168 \text{ million M}^3$$

How Miyamoto and Gilani calculated Total Rubble

The researchers calculated the average amount of rubble produced per building floor; and taking the upper bound of their estimate ($p < .025$) came up with a liberal figure of $0.805 \text{ m}^3 \text{ per m}^2$ of building footprint per floor

They then calculated the percentage of red buildings that MTPTC had found in their evaluations; the number of floors that red buildings had; the average square meters per floor; and finally generalized these calculations to the estimated population of 410,000 affected buildings to come up with a maximum amount of rubble.

Table 1: Damage intensity red-tagged buildings used to make calculations

<u>Damage intensity</u>	<u>No. of buildings</u>
Null data	5,488
0%	109
0%–1%	5,635
1%–10%	209
10%–30%	743
30%–60%	4,931
60%–100%	18,381
100%	20,650
Total	56,146

Table 2: Stories red-tagged buildings used to make calculations

<u>Stories</u>	<u>Buildings</u>	<u>No. of floors</u>
1	42,242	42,242
2	10,765	21,530
3	2,573	7,719
4+	518	2,590
Total	56,098	74,081

Source: H. Kit Miyamoto, Ph.D., S.E., and Amir Gilani, Ph.D.,

S.E. Miyamoto International

6 MTPTC Structural Evaluations


Most observers consider MTPTC structural evaluations of buildings in greater Port-au-Prince among the most successful post earthquake endeavors contributing to home returns. Structural evaluations were thought to have reassured people that their homes were safe and encouraged them to return. BARR collected data to test this hypothesis. We found no evidence to support it.

6.1 Opinions and Understanding of the Evaluations

BARR found that respondents overwhelmingly understood what the evaluation color codes meant (77%: Figure 49); they understood the repairs that needed to be done (74% Figure 50); they thought the evaluations were well done (74% no figure); more than half said that the evaluations did encourage them to return home (53% no figure) and, indeed, MTPTC evaluations were occurring precisely during that period when people were returning home (Figure 51).


But as seen on the following pages, the image of MTPTC encouraging people to return home is difficult to corroborate. Residents who said the evaluations encouraged them to return home did not in fact return home after the evaluations any more frequently than before; more ominously, people who live in condemned houses appear to have ignored the evaluations: we found 85% of yellow and 64% of red buildings re-occupied.

Figure 49: Respondents who Understood what Color Codes Meant




n = 1,928 Missing = 482

Figure 50: Respondents who Understood what Repairs were Needed



n = 1,928 Missing = 183

Figure 51: Months that Evaluations were Being Conducted Compared with Months when People were Returning Home



n = 1,928 Missing = 560
(for evaluations)

6.2 Timing of Home Return vs Evaluations

When we examined whether people returned home before or after their residential building was evaluated, we found that overall there was no significant difference; indeed more people returned home before rather than after the evaluations (Figure 52).

When we took it further and compared those who said that evaluations did or did not encourage them to return home with those who actually came home before versus after the evaluations, the only significance was that the majority of people who said that the evaluations did not encourage them to return home in fact returned home before the evaluations. In other words, most people who said the evaluations did not encourage them to return home were telling the truth, i.e. they in fact tended not to have returned home before hand. The same cannot be said for those who said that evaluations did encourage them to return home (see Figures 53 and 54).

Figure 52: Percent of People who Return Home Before vs. After Evaluations






Figure 53: Residents who say that Evaluations Did Encourage them to Return Home



n = 1,389 Missing = 539

Figure 54: Residents who say that Evaluations Did Not Encourage them to Return Home



n = 1,389 Missing = 539

[note that most of the 539 respondents who are “missing” were indifferent]

To make the point unequivocal, we controlled for whether people were accurately reporting on their behavior by introducing the question, “would you have returned home when you did if the house had *not* been evaluated.” What we found was that respondent behavior was essentially random, meaning there was no relationship between people saying that they were encouraged to return home and when they returned. Indeed, although not statistically significant, more people who said they would not have returned at that time in fact returned before the house was evaluated (Figure 55).

Before and After Evaluation Returns
For Respondents who said,

- a) evaluations encouraged them to return home,
- b) they say they would not otherwise have returned at that time (from 2nd round of BARR)





Figure 55: Before and After



n = 1,925, Missing = 374; Note that most of those “missing” did not know

Text Box G: Red House Danger

As of the writing of this report, the Webpage for PADF--USAID's partner in the structural evaluations—includes a quote from Dr Miyamoto speaking on October 27th to the Organization of American States about prospects for yellow house repairs.

"The math adds up... 800,000 people could leave the camps and go to repaired homes."

We now know that most people already had returned home, whether the homes were repaired or not: 85% of Yellow buildings are occupied; 64% of Red buildings are occupied.

What does that mean? It means that as many as 570,178 people (114,493 residential groups or families) are living in 84,951 homes that may collapse in foul weather or in the event of another tremor. That's yellow buildings. For Red buildings it means that 465,996* people (100,430 residential groups) are living in 73,846 buildings that might collapse at any moment. Discussing the growing problem of people returning to unsafe yellow and red buildings, Dr. Miyamoto emphasized the gravity of the situation,

"Occupied yellow and red houses are extremely dangerous since many are a collapse hazard. People occupy these houses despite communications and warnings from MTPTC engineers since they have nowhere to go but the camps. People do not want to stay in these tents. Security is poor and they are exposed to diseases. I see little children sleeping next to the heavily cracked walls every day."

-Kit Miyamoto, PhD, February 28th, 2011, personal communication

One thing that the figures should not mean is that MTPTC- UN-PADF- Miyamoto undertaking has been a failure. A better way to look at it is that we haven't devoted enough resources to fixing the yellow house and dealing with the Red house problem. Of the 99,043 or more yellow houses, funding to fix only 4,000 has been allocated. The Solutions according to Dr. Miyamoto,

1. Repair yellow houses as soon and as many as possible before next hurricane season. USAID/OFDA Repair Pilot Program has proved the efficiency of this strategy. The program can be executed in 24 months for all yellow houses.
2. Develop Red house demolition and reconstruction program. Majority of red houses are located inside of the block where power equipments cannot be reached. Manual demolition with engineering supervision is required. We are developing new small residential house plans using locally available materials with MTPTC. Construction cost and schedule is very effective. People are not in favor of T shelters because of lack of security.

* The calculation is: (total number of buildings in color category) x (percentage of buildings in color category that are occupied) x (residents per occupied color category residence unit) x (resident units per household) = building population, e.g. Red building population: (115,384)(.64)(4.64)(1.36) =465,996]

Figure 56: Red House Store in Ravine Pentad



Figure 57: Red house being repaired Mayi Gate



7 Demographics

In analyzing re-occupancy rates there remains the question, where are 16% of people who have not returned home? There are several possibilities, the important of which were: a) they could be dead, b) they could be in the countryside, c) they could be in camps, or d) they could be in other houses. BARR survey data allows us to answer the question as well as reconstruct demographic events beginning with the earthquake.

Specifically, we asked people asked how many residents in the building died, where people went after the earthquake (as mention in Section 3), and the current location of living people. In cases where the entire residence or building was absent, we asked neighbors. With these data we are able to calculate the total people killed as a result of the earthquake, the total people who went to camps after the earthquake, and the current total living absentees from earthquake impacted houses as well as the whereabouts of these absentees. We got confidence interval midpoints of 65,575 killed; 258,085 IDPs from earthquake impacted houses and 42,608 of the later in Camps (Figure 58 and Figure 59; and take note that these figures, while they appear exact, are midpoints in an estimated range). The data is a far cry from that of GOH and OIM.

7.1 **Estimating the Death Toll**

The best place to begin illustrating how we arrived at the calculations is with the number of people killed in the earthquake, a figure necessary in order to arrive at the other absentee estimates (i.e. deaths must be subtracted from the overall absentees). First, we cannot simply multiply the percentage deaths we found in BARR by the total Port-au-Prince population because the sample was selected from lower Port-au-Prince and hence we have More Red and Yellow color coded

Figure 58: Estimates for Death Toll, IDPs, and Legitimate IDPs in Camps




Figure 59: Comparison of BARR Estimates to GOH and UN Estimates






Figure 60: Comparison of BARR and MTPTC Percentages of Color Coded Buildings




buildings and fewer Green than MTPTC found (for example, accounting for 7% missed houses, MTPTC yielded 18% Red buildings for the entire Port-au-Prince region while BARR had 26% red buildings; see Figure 60)

Figure 61: Average Deaths per Residence and per Color Code



What we can do is calculate the deaths per residence for color coded categories (Figure 61). We can then use this figure to multiply by the MTPTC findings for greater Pot-au-Prince (qualifying it by the high death rate we found for buildings that MTPTC did not evaluate) and then adopting the UN conclusion that the area impacted by the earthquake had a population of 3 million (UN/Miyamota); all using the 5.2 person average residence size found in BARR and consistently found in large surveys throughout the island (something so consistent at to arguably be considered a law).

Assumptions:
 -5.2 people per household
 -3 million impacted



Number People killed in the earthquake
46,190 to 84,961
(p < .01%)

Text Box H: Death Toll of 46,109 – 84, 961

On the 14th of January, two days after the earthquake, President Preval estimated the number of people killed from 30,000 to 50,000 dead. "But," he added, "it's too early to give a number."

On the 15th of January, three days after the earthquake, the Red Cross estimated 50,000 dead. The Government of Haiti (GOH) gave the same estimate until January 23 when it issued a death count of 111,481. On January 24 the GOH raised the count to 150,000; on January 31st to 212,000; on February 6th it was still at 212,000; three days later, on February 9th, the GOH raised the count to 230,000.

On February 9, when AP investigators went to the government burial sites to verify the increases, workers told them that the inflow of bodies had dropped off 10 days earlier, at the end of January. In the preceding week only a single truck carrying two bodies had arrived.

The only news agency to question the issue again was Netherlands Radio Worldwide. They checked all Government sources and concluded that as of February 23, 52,000 people had been buried. The Central government reported 20,000 to 30,000 deaths in Leogane; but Leogane authorities claimed to have buried 3,364. Similarly, the Central government claimed 4,000 dead in Jacmel. The French NGO ACTED, whose workers were involved in burying the Jacmel deceased, reported 145 bodies. Jacmel authorities settled on 300 to 400 dead. On February 21, the GOH raised the total body count to 300,000.

In June 2010, Oxfam and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) homepage's were citing the government figure of 230,000. World Vision implied there were more, saying "at least 230,000 dead." Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) said that the earthquake "killed hundreds of thousands of people." In the next year, most journalists referred to the numbers as "the government estimates," often qualifying them as questionable. Other agencies lapsed into citing, without question, the latest government figure of 300,000. On the January 12, 2011 anniversary of the quake, the government figures on the death toll rose to 316,000.


The BARR survey specifically asked people how many of the residents in the building died, where the survivors went after the earthquake and the current location of the survivors. The survey focused on the hard hit area of lower Port-au-Prince, with a high concentration of yellow and red houses. With this data, they were able to make some inferences about the number of people killed, the total number of people who went to camps and the total living absentees from earthquake impacted houses, as well as the whereabouts of the absentees. Deaths per residence were calculated by using average occupancy per house and average death rate by yellow, green and red houses. The area impacted by the earthquake had an estimated population of 3 million people. An estimate based on the findings suggests that the number of people killed in the earthquake ranges between 46,190 and 84,961, much lower than commonly accepted estimates.

[Sources: AP, CNN, Washington Post, Miami Herald, Radio Netherland World (see bibliography)]

7.2 Estimating IDPs

To calculate the current number of IDPs we did the same thing as with the death rates. We calculated the absentees per house per color category (Figure 62). We then used MTPTC findings of percent red, yellow, and green buildings for the entire region. In this case however, we also subtracted those killed (it is interesting to note that if the high government figure of 300,000 people killed were accurate there would currently be only 23,085 IDPs)

Figure 62: Absentees
per Residence and per Color Code



Estimated Total IDPs
(people not returned to Earthquake impacted homes)
141,158 to 375,031
(p < .01%)

7.3 Estimating IDPs in Camps Immediately Following The earthquake


In calculating the number IDPs who occupied camps immediately after the earthquake in January 2010, we simply multiplied the percent of respondents who reported having gone to camps (30%) by the total impacted population (less the death toll). To calculate the confidence interval, we then used proportional probability (i.e. yes/no, meaning either went to the camps or did not).

Estimated number of people who went to
camps in January 2010
866,412 to 894,588
(p<.01)

7.4 Estimating the Number of IDPs Currently in Camps

In coming up with the current number of *IDPs in camps*, we multiplied the figure of Total Current IDPs times the proportion of absentees who were reported to be in camps (15%). Specifically, of the 1,356 residences with absentee members, 15% of respondents (family or neighbors) report those absentees as principally located in camps (see Figure 63)

Figure 63: Location of Absentees



Estimated number of IDPs in camps
18,690 to 66,625
(p < .01%)

Text Box I: So who is in the Camps?

We know that immediately following the earthquake 30% of the BARR population went to camps. That translates to a population estimate of 880,500. We also know from BARR that people didn't like the camps on every score—crime, electricity, water, work, general sense of protection and availability of food—respondents preferred their neighborhood to the camps (Figure 64). And we know that by the end of March more than 40% of people who went to camps were back home (Figure 65). But according to many aid organizations, such as J/P HRO at the Petion Ville Club Camp, in March the camps were still growing. So who was going to the camps?

Figure 64: Camps vs. Neighborhoods





Figure 65: Rate of Home Return from Camps



As the aid began to flow, some people erected ghost tents, shelters made of wispy sheets too small to accommodate people sleeping. There were unofficial reports of the US military using infrared cameras to verify that many tents were empty. And we know from NGO workers that many the tent cities sprang up as a reaction to aid distribution; that when aid workers arrived people would literally come running from nearby houses to occupy their tents.

There were byproducts of jockeying for aid that even the recipients may not have anticipated. One local leader who participated in setting up camp committees for distribution explained,

“Where there was a food distribution, it’s by tent that they did it. So a single family would come to have several tents.... every daughter took one. In that way each daughter became an adult. That’s what made so many of the young women get pregnant... they don’t live with their families, no one is watching over them. You see this in all the camps. You find it in every single camp.”^v

Even as MTPTC fixed yellow houses, most people tried to preserve their places in camps. Kit Miyamota who designed and oversaw the MTPTC/UNUPS/PADF house assessment program and the repairs of 2,000 houses recounted that,

“When we repair yellow houses, we get know the owners and renters very well since we stay there for an average of three days. Our Haitian engineers know their living status. After we repair yellow houses, approximately 100% of people return for 24 hours a day. But about 90% of them keep the unoccupied tents in the IDP camps since they hope to receive services and money to remove them.”

But we also know that some tent cities are real, very real. Camps such as Jean Marie Vincent and the former Petion Ville golf course have become veritable towns. They have evolved into legitimate communities where people live fulltime, where they cook, sleep, bath, where stores and internet services have been installed. So who’s in those camps?

8 Building Back for Better or Worse

BARR survey included a series of question meant to clarify people's outlook, hopes and fears, and to understand what impact agencies are having on targeted needs. Coupled with the other observations seen in the report these findings give us an overview of the direction that recovery and rebuilding is taking-- for better or worse, and with or without the international community.

A summary of the findings:


- 51% of respondents believe an earthquake will happen again; 39% think that it is a near certainty
- 66% have no intention of building another house with a cement roof
- 16% Intend to build another structure soon; 16% already have, spending an average of US \$501.32; of this figure 11% have a cement roof
- 41% of respondents (59% of homeowners) intend to repair or improve their home; 17% already have, spending an average of US \$2,011.70 in the process
- 63% have heard of methods to build back better—36% have not; of that 90% was via radio, television or *teledjol* (word of mouth)
- 40% of all respondents felt like they knew how to build a stronger house
- the primary impediment to rebuilding was access to money; 86% said so, compared to 8% citing no land, 2% impeded by state regulations, 3% who fear another earthquake, and 2% content with what they have
- less than 1% had t-shelters in their yard, 1.5% had an improvised shelter they built themselves; 8% had one or more tents, 20% of which had no one sleeping in them, 50% had owners sleeping in them, 20% renters, and the remaining 10% friends or guest
- Only 10% of residences reported anyone in the house having participated in CFW

The above figures and what we have learned from the BARR tell us much about what has happened when the earthquake struck, what has happened in the year since, and the direction that recovery and reconstruction is taking. What we now know is that not as many people were killed, most people began returning home much faster than thought and 86% of people have now returned; they paid to remove rubble and removed it themselves; although they fear another earthquake more than half intend or have fixed their home, less than half know how to make it stronger. We know that, yes, people from earthquake impacted homes went to camps; but few stayed. They began to come home in the first month and then streamed home in the ensuing 7 months. While they were leaving less fortunate people appear to have been moving in.

So people have started building back, they did not wait for the international community. Most did so on their own. And there is also good reason to believe that most do not share the State, NGO, or international community's priorities. There is good reason to believe we are not on the same track of reconstruction as the vast bulk of the population. Popular neighborhoods benefited from rubble cleanup, particularly in the streets and they hailed the MTPTC evaluations as a great thing. But coming home had little to nothing to do with the evaluations and many re-occupied their condemned houses.

Even Rubble removal, something that BARR found contributed to 10% of home returns and that the international community has identified as among the populations most pressing needs, does not rank high on the list of needs that people themselves identify. When we asked people to compare the importance of rubble to other needs in the months following the earthquake, they consistently put rubble removal second. Indeed, we can infer that most people in Port-au-Prince would live in, on, and around the rubble if it meant resolving more basic problems of access to water, food, electricity, latrines, housing, capital and jobs (see Figure 66).

Figure 66: Rubble vs. Other Needs



9 Conclusions and Recommendations

So what does it all mean?

It means that faced with staying in the camps or repairs that were beyond the means of most people, the MTPTC evaluations had no statistical impact on timing of home returns

It means that many more people than thought have a home that they are living in; for better or worse, they didn't wait for international community to fix them

It means that we may be facing a massive second crisis if we do not help people with the 73,846 inhabited buildings that may collapse at any moment or the 84,951 inhabited buildings that may collapse in heavy wind or foul weather

It means that the 8.8 million tons of debris estimated by Miyamota using red tagged houses, needs to be revised to consider 64% of those houses are now at least partially occupied, and an unknown but probably large proportion of those will never be destroyed

It means that most of the people in the camps are people hoping to take advantage of the aid; not necessarily renters but people who see an opportunity and who are so desperate that they are willing to forgo their normal lives, split their families, and maintain a tent in hopes of getting paid or receiving a plot of land

It means that if our objective is to house people and make the best uses of our resources in meeting the needs that Haitians themselves identify, we may be misdirecting resources.

We suggest that donors and NGOs drop notions of utopian neighborhoods and consider reinforcing popular reconstruction processes that are occurring or have been occurring. Two issues and avenues of recourse are most conspicuous and urgent,

- 1) Accept the land tenure system that exists: Contrary to the formal system, 90% of Haitian citizens rely on what can be called a folk system; 70% of the people we interviewed in the BARR survey believe they own the house they live in, 60% believe they own the land it sits on, and only 23% of those people feel insecure about their property rights. Rather than creating a new titular system based on cadastral surveys—something associated, a) with costs that many people cannot afford, b) that the state is incapable of implementing, and c) that if it were implemented would give unscrupulous lawyers and con artists a mechanism to swindle and evict people from property (see Text Box C)—we should accept the system that exists and search for ways to reinforce and legitimize that system, as CHF is currently doing in Ravine Pentad. Ann Young Lee, CHF field director, says that a primary lesson her and colleagues at CHF and IOM have learned since the earthquake is to work with the prevailing land tenure system,

“We realized that if we have to wait until there is a formal land tenure system in place we aren't going to get anywhere at all.... And why would these people invest all their money in concrete houses if they didn't have any confidence in the system that does exist. We have to work with the culture. We have to accept the system.”

To assure that tenants have no ownership conflicts with property that CHF improves, they ask for three neighbors to “witness” that the person owns the house and they procure a Memorandum of Understanding from the mayor’s office. In this way CHF is strengthening the system that exists and increasing security associated with it without incurring costs that many people in popular neighborhoods could not afford to meet.

- 2) The most urgent message that comes from the BARR study is the need for a massive program of yellow house fixing and red house demolition for those that cannot be repaired and red house fixing for those that can be repaired. Such an undertaking also provides an opportunity, what is perhaps the most useful lesson of the first year of reconstruction. The lesson comes from the MTPTC house repair effort. It would behoove the donors to take note of it. In the words of Dr. Kit Miyamoto,

It is truly team work ... Haitian engineers, masons and people in the community are the ones who do it all. They are the ones who make this work. I see everyday people giving support to our engineers and masons. This ranges from gang control to giving them water and snacks. This program and the structural evaluations made MTPTC popular among the population. Our 250 engineers and 500 masons have touched 3 million people. I feel we have the support of the people. This momentum can be used in the right strategy to rebuild this place much better than before.

This could be a great opportunity for the Haitian masses to capture not only technology but money for investment, money that stimulates the local economy. Eighty percent unemployment comes from over reliance on imports and too many free services and goods from the international community. How can a Haitian laborer who wants to make \$5 per day compete against smart college students from abroad ... Wherever possibly local materials and people should be used for reconstruction. We should focus on capacity building rather than doing it for Haiti.

People want to be assisted with financial, training, strategic development and leadership from internationals. But the objective should be that we work ourselves out of jobs in Haiti. It is possible to do this through the massive reconstruction effort we have in front of us. This may be the best opportunity for Haiti.^{vi}

Kit Miyamota, personal communication

End Notes

ⁱ Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for How Much Time Residents Have Lived in Neighborhood

	N	Min	Max	Mean	SE	SD
Time residents have lived in the neighborhood	1911	.1	84	16.8	.3036	13.3

ⁱⁱ With this in mind it is useful to note that Payne and Associates in a 2000 presentation to the World Bank, described private land tenure as largely a concept that was foisted on developing countries in service of colonial interests. Moreover, Payne and Associates argue that the legal costs associated with registration, taxes, and building codes discriminates against lower income groups forcing them into unauthorized settlements. They conclude that forcing a titular system on the poor only exacerbate evictions of the most vulnerable social groups.

ⁱⁱⁱ OCHA. Haiti Earthquake - Population Movements out of Port-au-Prince - 8 February 2010. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MNIN-82GQYS?OpenDocument&query=population%20movement&emid=EQ-2010-000009-HTI>. Retrieved 11 May 2010.

^{iv} Critical data in Charts 45 thru 48 comes from the second half of the survey only; these questions were added during the mid survey evaluation. The findings are consistent with what we know from the first half regarding percentage of residents with rubble in the yard. Probabilities are calculated accordingly.

^v *Nan yon fanmi chak pitit fi pran yon tant, chak moun vinn gran moun. Si gen distribisyon, se pa tant yap fèl. Yon sèl fanmi vinn gen [plizyè] tant...Se sak fè jenn fi yo vinn ansent...Yo pa abite ak fanmi yo, vinn pa gen siveyans...Bagay sa ou respekte lan tout kan nèt [ou jwenn li nan tout kan nèt]*

^{vi} Institutions for social action, specifically the religious and educational institutions that Haitians in popular communities devote their time and attention to are the most logical loci of action. As foreign aid workers we tend to eschew religious institutions, but they are the most popular institutions in Port-au-Prince. Nothing comes close. 63% attend religious meetings compared to 7 percent who attend political meetings. If you wanted to get a message out, where would you go?

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Name	Area	Attribute	Telephone/Ref
Charles Jn Paul	Ravine Pintade	Influential	Impasse 138
Claudia Marcellus	Ravine Pintade	Group Leader	Impasse 138
Eddy Dorvilas	Ravine Pintade	Group Leader	37493043
Eddy Miot	Ravine Pintade	Group Leader	Houblon
Galy Lestin	Ravine Pintade	Group Leader	38902073
Geoges Corvington Appolon	Ravine Pintade	Ex resident	34033272
Group of 4 IDPs	Ravine Pintade	Camp Vaillant	Junior 37834938
Group of 5 IDPs	Ravine Pintade	Men	Eddy Dorvilas
Group of 5 Returnees	Ravine Pintade	Men	Eddy Dorvilas
Group of 6 Returnees	Ravine Pintade	Women	Claudia Marcellus
Group of 7 IDPs	Ravine Pintade	Women	Claudia Marcellus
Junior André Julien	Ravine Pintade	Group Leader	37834938
Marius Oriana	Ravine Pintade	Red house occupant	37325258
Maxène Etienne	Ravine Pintade	Group Leader	37097877
Pierre Pierre-Louis	Ravine Pintade	Influential	Impasse 138
Runot Aristide	Ravine Pintade	Influential	3726290
Steeve Laroche	Ravine Pintade	School Director	31044505
X	Ravine Pintade	Seminarist	St Antoine Church
Yvon Brignole	Ravine Pintade	Influential	Impasse 138
François Chérestal	Delmas 32	Group Leader	37555958
Group of 8 IDPs	Delmas 32	Camp Nan Bannan	
Group of 6 Returnees	Delmas 32	Mixte	Venel 37818748
Jn Osnel Duverneau	Delmas 32	Group Leader	34274693
Lucien Toussaint	Delmas 32	School Director	34243335

Lucius Octellus	Delmas 32	Old resident (80 yrs)	Evens 3766 0995
Mr. St Eloi	Delmas 32	Group Leader (Notab)	Roland Maurice
Mr. Véus	Delmas 32	Group Coordinator	36512761
Roland Maurice	Delmas 32	Group Leader (Notab)	36329031
William Smith	Delmas 32	Group Leader	38957474
Allemand Pierre	Delmas 2	Influential	37146840
David Nivrose	Delmas 2	Group Leader	38035020
Eder nare	Delmas 2	Group Leader	38035020
Group of 3 Returnees	Delmas 2	Mixte	Madeleine 34961531
Group of 5 IDPs	Delmas 2	Camp Parc la Place	Dominique 36780181
Jenny Carlo Rools Joseph	Delmas 2	Pastor/President of Camp	37136450
Manno	Delmas 2	Baz Cameroun Leader	Richardson 37605245
Richardson Charlottin	Delmas 2	Influential	37605245
Roger Lacroix	Delmas 2	Houngan/City delegate	37133190
Beltray Angelot	Bel Air	Group Leader	36695421
Group of 5 IDPs	Bel Air	Camp Place Cathédrale	Jn Meschac Th36108732
Group of 8 Returnees	Bel Air	Mixte	Jn Meschac Th36108732
Guy Robert Gourdet	Bel Air	Group Coordinator	37978110
Henry St Cyr	Bel Air	Group Leader	34459149
Jean Romel Bolivar	Bel Air	Group Leader	37329200
Jn Meschac Thibaud	Bel Air	Group Leader	36108732
Junior Jérôme	Bel Air	Group Leader	31086270
Group of 3 Returnees	Nerrettes	Mixte	Raynald 3426 2289
Group of 4 IDPs	Nerrettes	Camp Ti Sous	Raynald 3426 2289
James René	Nerrettes	Group Leader	36894928
Jimmy Gervais	Nerrettes	Group Leader	Raynald Saintil 3426 2289

Raynald Saintil	Nerrettes	Group Leader	34262289
Group of 4 IDPs	Carrefour Feuilles	Camp Place Jérémie	Mme Bruny 34254590
Group of 4 returnees	Carrefour Feuilles	Mixte	Steeve Samedi 34468287
Hérolde Pierre	Carrefour Feuilles	Pastor	38891639
Jimmy Bélizaire	Carrefour Feuilles	Group Leader	Steeve Samedi 34468287
Julio Victor	Carrefour Feuilles	Group Leader	31045752
Steeve Samedi	Carrefour Feuilles	Group Leader	34468287
Widelson Pierre-Louis	Carrefour Feuilles	Group leader	37017708
Audré Clergé	Rue Joseph Janvier	Group Leader	38693908
Charlmé Hervé	Rue Joseph Janvier	Group Leader	37089476
Group of 5 IDPs	Rue Joseph Janvier	Camp Dumerlin	Patricia Paul 3668 9288
Group of 5 Returnees	Rue Joseph Janvier	Mixte	Audré Clergé 38693908
Louidès Séide	Rue Joseph Janvier	Group Leader	37603028
Maurice Clergé	Rue Joseph Janvier	Old resident (13 yrs)	Audré Clergé 38693908
Michel Jean Pierre	Rue Joseph Janvier	Group Leader	31062210
Patricia Paul	Rue Joseph Janvier	Group Leader	36689288
Antonio Dorsainvil	Portail Léogane	Group Leader	37331859
Group of 5 returnees	Portail Léogane	Men	39020418
Gustin Frédérique	Portail Léogane	Group Leader	34549268
Jameson Noel	Portail Léogane	Group Leader	38029139
Jn Eddy Paul	Portail Léogane	Group Leader	38861274
Lionel Jean	Portail Léogane	Group Leader	36648047

4 Annex: Calculations for Death Count and IDPs

In this section we explain the calculations for the IDP and death counts. Note that we use the official population figure of 3 million as earthquake impacted baseline for calculation (UN, USAID, IOM, OCHA).

In tables below are the calculations and the logic for them. The only numbers “Given” are the standard errors for the means and the means for deaths and absentees per residential unit/family calculated from the BARR data and the percentages of green, yellow, and red residential buildings found in the MTPTC surveys. But with one qualifier, BARR found that 7% of buildings were not evaluated. In our calculations we assumed that the unmarked houses came equally from each category, Red, Yellow, and Green. A large Standard Deviation for deaths per household lent support to that assumption. Accordingly we added 6.9% to the total MPTPTC households; and we subtracted 2.33% per house category and added it to the None category (which incidentally at, 32%, had the highest average death toll)

Table A1: Estimating Number of People Killed in the Earthquake

	Green	Yellow	Red	None	Total
MPTPTC residential buildings	108348 (52%)	50810 (24%)	44923 (18%)	14082 (7%)	218163 (100%)
BARR sample	33%	32%	26%	7%	100%
Generalized to pop.	306,522	140,514	104,941	40,909	592,885
Mean deaths per household	0.06	0.09	0.28	0.126	0.13
Standard error of the mean	0.011	0.009	0.026	0.026	0.012
2.3 standard errors	0.0253	0.0207	0.0598	0.0598	0.0276
Range with p<.01	.0347 .0853	.0693 .1107	.2202 .3398	.0662 .1858	.1024 .1576
Total population killed	6501	4573	12578	1774	77075
Range estimate for pop killed	10636 26146	9738 15555	23108 35659	2708 7601	60711 93439

Table A2: Deaths Per color Category

Total but calculated per color cat	
46190	84961

Note that for the IDPs the two extremes of the death count tally are added or subtracted from the IDP range, meaning the minimum killed is taken from the high end of the IDP estimate and the maximum estimate of those killed is taken from the lower end of the range

Table A4: Estimating Total IDPs that are from Earthquake Impacted Homes

	Green	Yellow	Red	None	Total
MTPTC residential buildings	108348 52%	50810 24%	44923 18%	14082 7%	218163 100%
BARR sample	33%	32%	26%	7%	100%
Generalized to pop.	306,522	140,514	104,941	40,909	592,885
Mean IDPs per household	-0.0291	0.5355	2.2981	0.3953	0.8215
Standard error of the mean	0.06246	0.05497	0.09425	0.1381	0.04034
2.3 standard errors	0.143658	0.126431	0.216775	0.31763	0.092782
Range with p<.01	-0.1727 0.1145	0.4091 0.6619	2.0813 2.5149	0.0777 0.71293	0.7287 0.9143
Total population absent	-8920	75245	241164	16171	487055
Range of estimates for IDP	-52954 35115	57480 93010	218416 263913	3177 29165	432046 542064

Table A5: Total IDPs Calculate Per Color Cartgory

Total but calculated per color cat	
226119	421203

Table A6 : IDP After Subtracting Death Count from Absentees

IDP range	
141,158	375,013

258,085

Table A7: Calculations for the reported absentees who are not in camps

proportion	0.1549	
SEM	0.00978	
2.3 X SEM	0.022494	
range	0.132406	0.177394

Table A8: Calculations for proportion of people in countryside

proportion	0.225	
SEM	0.01134	
2.3 X SEM	0.026082	
range	0.198918	0.251082

5 Annex: Port-au-Prince Cluster Sample Survey

The BARR survey team set out to conduct a 54 cluster 3,600 residential building survey in Port-au-Prince neighborhoods (cluster was defined by “n” number of houses closest to a selected geographical point). The population were control versus treatment groups. Neighborhoods where rubble clearing had occurred were to be compared to neighborhoods where rubble clearing had not occurred (this was dropped during analysis as there were not significant differences between the two groups). Neighborhoods in the control groups (non-rubble clearing areas) were to have approximately equivalent high proportions of buildings destroyed by the January 12th earthquake as found in the treatment groups (the proportion per region was to be determined from the MTPTC evaluations). The exact number of treatment versus control group clusters was modified because there were insufficient qualified sampling units in the treatment sampling frame.

5.1 Treatment group

The intention was to chose 1,800 residential buildings that comprised 36 clusters of 50 buildings each (one cluster is defined as the 50 houses closest to a selected geographical point); as mentioned, in analysis we dropped the distinction because of a lack of significant differences,

- clusters were selected randomly from site lists provided by organizations that have been part of the USAID funded rubble removal program (Chemonics, CHF, and DAI),
- the residential building questionnaire was applied to one in two (900) of those buildings

5.2 Control group

- 1,800 residential buildings that comprised 18 clusters of 100 buildings each (for an explanation of the different number of clusters in the control vs treatment groups see ‘Sample Size Justification,’ below),
- clusters were selected from neighborhoods not included in the USAID Rubble Removal Program (RRP) or any other rubble removal program.

5.3 Sample size justification

The reason for the different size and number of clusters in the Treatment vs Control groups (36 vs 18) was to assure that the influence of rubble removal on building occupant behavior was of sufficient size for comparison. Treatment groups depended on proximity to the rubble removal site—the closer to the site we assumed the greater the influence. With respect to the control group subjects, there was no rubble removal site and hence no differential influence to be calculated. As stated there was no significant difference between control and treatment groups—due principally to the widespread rubble removal—and hence this is not a part of the final analysis.

The justification for 3,600 residential buildings is that the sample size had to be large enough to permit comparison of principal sample populations (i.e. people who need rubble cleared versus people who do not; and people who experienced household structural evaluations) at a degree of accuracy approaching ($\sim \pm 2\%$) and with a reasonably high degree of statistical probability ($p > 95\%$; see Table 1). Because building evaluations are compared to themselves (before


and after), the number of samples units (n) approaches 3,600. It was therefore rubble removal versus non-removal that was considered the limiting factor for the size of the treatment and control group. The most important point in this respect is that the optimal sample size in cost versus statistical validity and precision was $n = 600$. This is a number inferior to the total number of Residential Building Questionnaires that was applied to residential buildings in each of the respective control versus treatment groups (total = 1,800).

Note also that, as discussed in greater detail below, in the cluster samples we chose every second building for in depth interviews (only those that were yellow and green coded), but surveyors documented the occupancy status of the skipped buildings on the Total Residential Building Occupancy List (TROL). Number and size of residential units before and after the earthquake were documented for all 3,600 residential buildings. This information was used in aggregate data analysis to bolster the sample size, making statistical calculation more robust in determining the impact of the rubble removal and residential building evaluations as well as allowing for more precise estimates of absentee and re-occupancy rates, and demographic variables such as death toll and migration after the earthquake. In short, analysis of the most basic variables of interest had the benefit of $n = 3,600$ buildings. Moreover, because approximately 20% of buildings were inhabited by two or more residential units (by which we mean all renters, proprietors, caretakers who pay for or are granted the use of a space within the building as a group), $n > 3,600$ residential units.

We wanted to obtain a widely distributed population of sub-samples sufficient to account during analysis for influences such as differential NGO activities and health services.

There was also a logistical justification for our sample size. Within each treatment cluster, data on building color code and occupancy was collected for a total of 50 residential buildings (100 for the 18 control group clusters); 25 of those buildings were selected for application of the extended household questionnaire (the figure was 50 for the control groups clusters); with each team of 5 surveyors conducting 10 surveys per day, that translated to two clusters per day per team (one per team per day in the case of the control groups) -- meaning that surveyors only need to be transported to two sites per team per day (see Survey Execution).

Figure A1: Sample Size



In coming up with a cost effective sample size, we considered that the most important questions we were to asking was,

- a) what is the difference in rates of return to residences in areas where there has versus has not been rubble removal activity, and
- b) what is the difference in return occupancy rates as a result of the MTPTC building evaluations

Both questions could be answered, yes/no: Rubble removal either did or it did not encourage an individual to return home; a building evaluation either did or it did not encourage occupants to return home.

With these points in mind, note that the middle bar in the graph above represents 'if 50% of homes in the treatment or control group are occupied,' and the two side bars represent 'if 10% and 90% of buildings in either group are occupied.' What the bars tell us is that the more occupancy rates tend to either extreme—close to zero or close to 100%--the more accurate the estimate will be for a given sample size. Another way to look at this is that the more the responses for our yes/no variable in question is skewed to zero or 100%, the smaller the sample size we needed for a relatively accurate estimation with little error. Because in our population, we expected (and found) close to or higher than 90% occupation of green and yellow houses, this meant that in an $n = 600$ sample we would be close to our 2% goal.

In the research design we proposed that we note yes/no occupancy rates for 3,600 buildings. This was our primary sample and gave us basic comparison data for a sample much larger than $n = 600$ (in this case it was $n = 1,800$ in both control and treatment groups).

We also took a more detailed sample of 1,800 of the Green and Yellow marked buildings. In this sub sample we expected to find multiple residential units in 20% of buildings. We capture this information in questions 45 – 68 on the Household Questionnaire when we asked, 'how many residential units occupied the building before and after the earthquake' and 'how many individuals were in each residential unit.' Because we now have this data on residences and numbers of members per residence we are able to make calculations using residences and individuals per residence as units of analysis, and are able to do so at a sample size higher than $n = 600$ (~720).

In summary, 600 buildings for each of our two rubble categories was meant as a minimum guarantee that we would be able to make estimates that approach $CI < 2\%$. In reality we can do much better than that with specified sample sizes. Note also that the MTPTC data is applicable to the entire 1,800 sub-sample

5.4 Sampling frames

Our sampling units were buildings in which people reside, i.e. homes. Thus the focus was on residential zones. Non-residential areas were eliminated from the sampling frame. When we encountered a non-residential area on the ground we replaced it with a cluster chosen from the nearest residential area.

5.4.1 MTPTC Building Assessments

The impact of structural assessments was to be captured in occupant reports on time of return versus known time of evaluations in the Residential Building Questionnaire (n=1,800). At the time of the survey, MTPTC had evaluated most of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. This meant that with regard to structural assessments most buildings sampled fell in both control and treatment group. This placed the emphasis in terms of obtaining a large sample size on rubble removal.

5.4.2 Rubble Removal Program (RRP)

Using data provided by USAID partners in the USAID RRP (Chemonics, and CHF; DAI was eliminated because they had only conducted Cash for Work and we were focused on Rubble Removal involving heavy equipment), we drew our sample almost entirely from lower Port-au-Prince metropolitan area with a few RR sites from Petion Ville. Using the random and systematic technique discussed below in the section “Sampling Selection” we selected 36 clusters (defined by houses closest to the specific geographic point on the list of Rubble Removal sites provided by the partners); as discussed we arbitrarily chose there to be 50 residential buildings per cluster; data on occupancy versus structural assessments was collected for all 50 residential buildings within the cluster; one in two (25) residential buildings per cluster were surveyed using the Residential Building Questionnaire. A Treatment group (areas where there is no rubble removal) of an equivalent number of buildings (1,800) but a less number of clusters (18) were chosen (meaning that we intended to take 18 clusters of 100 buildings each).

5.4.3 Stratification

MTPTC assessments had already been conducted for most of Port-au-Prince. Thus, with respect to building assessments, before and after groups were derived from a comparison of interviewee reports on when they returned to their home (before or after the assessment); as well as for when the assessments occurred versus when occupants actually returned to their homes. As stated elsewhere, this meant that the principal stratification issue—contingent on what can be thought of as our treatment versus control group samples—was rubble removal activity.

5.4.4 Pre-stratification

The sample population was stratified (50/50) into areas that were part of USAID RRP versus areas that have experienced no outside intervention with respect to rubble.

5.4.5 Post-Stratification

The sample was large enough, and the sub-clusters chosen at wide enough intervals, that post stratification could be employed for most variables of interest, such as residential building type (an indicator of socio-economic status), topography (hill versus flat areas), neighborhood services (older neighborhoods with services versus newer neighborhoods with no services), and NGO programs (whether programs have or will be carried out in the neighborhoods) proximity to specific camps and building type. In the analysis we have not taken these variables into consideration because of limited time.

5.5 Sample Selection


5.5.1 Treatment group

As mentioned, for the Treatment group cluster selection we chose our samples from lists of specific latitudinal and longitudinal points where Chemonics and CHF had removed rubble (most all points are located in Delmas, Carrefour, Carrefour Fueil Tabarre, Turgeau, and a few areas of Petion Ville). The total number of points/clusters were divided by 36 (the target number of clusters for the treatment group) to yield 'n.' We then used a random starting point and systematically selected every nth point unit until we selected the 36 total points/clusters. While in the office we identified the chosen sites both on the map (meaning in terms of street, topographical features, and neighborhood location), and in Google Earth using latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates. In practice, however, there were problems. Some points overlapped, some were identical, and geographical names for points did not coincide with the actual location Below are the selected Treatment group points

5.5.2 Control group

For the control group sample, specific geographic points within known non-rubble removal areas were selected randomly and systematically from the areas that were hardest hit. To choose the points we used a simple grid overlay technique.

Figure A2: Areas with Most Damage




5.6 Survey Process

5.6.1 First Stage: Sample Selection

We needed 18 sites/clusters. At the second finest grid level, there were ~100 cross-hairs in the target area (see Figure ##). Thus, we divided 100 by 18. Since $(107/18) < 6$, we choose a random starting point between 1 and 6 (we selected the first number less than six in a phone book); then beginning at the 2nd cross hair we systematically selected every 5th cross-hair until we had exhausted our selections.

Figure A3: Selected Cross-Hairs at Second to Finest Level



5.6.2 Second Stage

We identified the selected cross hair sites and then searched—using Google Earth—for the destroyed building nearest to the cross hair. To qualify the neighborhoods had to be lower to middle income neighborhoods similar in pattern to those in the RR selections. We also took sites at equal intervals between the selected cross sites to serve as replacement sites should a site for some reason be disqualified.

Figure A4: Selected Sites Closest to Cross Hairs




Table A9: Treatment Group: Selected Sites from NGO Rubble Removal Lists

	Picked and Mapped	Cluster checked	Latitude	Longitude
1	Alfred Vieux	Ave Chrisophe	18°31'47.39"N	72°16'44.11"W
2	Angel Mag Amb y R Nico	Mag Abr y R Nico	18°32'1.39"N	72°20'23.42"W
3	Angel Rue Titus y Magloire	Error in location	18°31'4.83"N	72°17'16.61"W
4	Ave Poupelard	Ave Poupelard	18°33'20.81"N	72°19'59.74"W
5	Avenue Christophe	Avenue Christophe	18°31'56.39"N	72°20'6.86"W
6	Bel Air 4	Bel Air 4	18°32'56.69"N	72°20'11.76"W
7	Canape Vert	Canape Vert	18°31'48.00"N	72°18'36.00"W
8	Col Mix Fre Alexandre	Col Mix Fre Alexandre	18°33'14.40"N	72°19'1.27"W
9	Col Yves Albert Bouche	Christophe and Cameau	18°31'48.14"N	72°21'5.94"W
10	College Fre Antoine	College Miste Fre	18°32'45.82"N	72°19'56.10"W
11	Corredor Etienne Pont	Corredor Etienne Pont	18°31'12.00"N	72°19'48.00"W
12	Cor Mon Thomas Bel Air 2	Cor Mon Thomas Bel Air 2	18°32'58.24"N	72°20'1.64"W
13	Delmas 2	Delmas 2 ~	18°33'12.31"N	72°20'1.50"W
14	Delmas 32 1	Demas 32 1	18°32'41.80"N	72°18'23.57"W
15	Delmas 32 4	Delmas 32 4	18°32'40.82"N	72°18'19.10"W
16	Ecole Mix Nouvelle Lune	Ecole Mix Nouvelle Lune	18°32'45.82"N	72°19'56.10"W
17	Fort Nat 7	Fort Natonal	18°32'47.22"N	72°19'41.20"W
18	Hopital Saint Famille	Hopital St Famille	18°32'50.19"N	72°19'49.14"W
19	Janvier	Joseph Janvier	18°31'48.00"N	72°20'24.00"W
20	Lakou Ti Chodye	Lakou Ti Chodye	18°31'31.44"N	72°19'57.47"W
21	Lekol Gentille Alouette	Lekol Gentille Alouette	18°31'34.21"N	72°20'3.97"W
22	Mon Laza Acess	Bwa Patat	18°37'12.00"N	72°15'0.00"W
23	Nerette	Error in location	18°31'4.83"N	72°17'16.61"W
24	Nerette 2	Error in location	18°32'16.98"N	72°21'7.88"W
25	Odan en Nerette	Odan en Naverette	18°31'32.02"N	72°17'21.01"W
26	Plongee	Plongee	18°31'15.82"	72°17'10.93"W
27	Rue Beavreul in Crois Deprez	Beauvreul y Crois Deprez	18°31'34.03"N	72°19'48.07"W
28	Rue Castral	Error in location	18°31'8.87"N	72°17'7.69"W
29	Rue Sore	Rue Sore	18°31'52.64"N	72°21'26.46"W
30	Ruelle Bredy in Terre	Error in location	18°31'36.84"N	72°20'13.92"W
31	Tibois 1	Tibois 1	18°31'35.87"N	72°21'55.98"W
32	Tibois 2	Tibois 2	18°31'26.99"N	72°21'30.73"W
33	Trou Vital	Trou Vital	18°33'5.94"N	72°20'3.95"W
34	Universite Leconte	Error in location	18°32'40.63"N	72°19'53.62"W

Table A10: Control Group: Selected Sites from Grid

	Picked and Mapped	Cluster checked	Latitude	Longitude
1	One	√	18°33'50.13"N	72°19'18.52"W
2	Two	√	18°33'55.58"N	72°18'14.62"W
3	Three	√	18°33'54.51"N	72°17'3.72"W
4	Four	√	18°33'41.66"N	72°19'13.21"W
5	Six	√	18°33'22.21"N	72°20'7.58"W
6	Seven	√	18°33'23.15"N	72°19'9.09"W
7	Eight	√	18°33'28.75"N	72°18'23.94"W
8	Nine	√	18°33'27.47"N	72°17'10.31"W
9	Ten	√	18°33'33.57"N	72°15'38.26"W
10	Eleven	√	18°33'17.42"N	72°19'24.14"W
11	Twelve	√	18°33'18.77"N	72°18'23.35"W
12	Fourteen	√	18°33'19.31"N	72°16'3.14"W
13	Sixteen	√	18°33'3.18"N	72°18'50.31"W
14	Seventeen	√	18°33'2.28"N	72°17'41.16"W
15	Eighteen	√	18°33'4.26"N	72°16'39.03"W
16	Twenty One	√	18°32'50.07"N	72°19'11.80"W
17	Twenty Four	√	18°32'50.18"N	72°16'20.01"W
18	Thirty	√	18°32'30.73"N	72°18'27.80"W
19	Thirty Two	√	18°32'14.77"N	72°20'39.77"W
20	Thirty Four	√	18°32'0.25"N	72°14'45.74"W
21	Thirty Six	√	18°31'51.47"N	72°15'33.89"W

5.6.3 Third Stage: Execution

The survey team was comprised of,

- 1 Survey Expert and Team Leader
- 1 Local Quantitative & Qualitative Expert
- 2 Supervisors
- 10 Junior Investigators
- 3 Data entry personnel
- 4 Drivers

All surveyors were University graduates.

The two teams of 5 surveyors each (total = 10) visited two clusters each per day, 4 clusters total, for a total of 200 buildings per day/100 RB questionnaires (in the case of Control Group clusters the figure is 2 clusters per day). Houses were marked with paint.

Table A11: Clusters per Group

	Clusters	Buildings per cluster	Total
Treatment group	36	50	1800
Control group	18	100	1800

Table A12: Cluster by Team, Day, and Questionnaires


Questionnaires	Per interviewer Per cluster	Per team per cluster	Clusters per team Per day		Total clusters per day		Total interviews per day
			Trtmnt	cntrl	Trtmnt	cntrl	
Profile List	10	50	2	1	4	2	200
Building Ques	5	25	2	1	4	2	100

Using Maps, Satellite photos, and GPS devices, supervisors located points and defined the cluster area surrounding them. Surveyors gathered basic information (color code, number of occupants before and after survey, numbe of occupants killed in the earthtquake, and location of missing occupants) on all buildings and residences (see ##). The surveyors choose one in two houses for indepth interview. Only yellow and green houses were chosen for further inquiry. The hosues were marked “ L ” with white paint. Data was codified and entered daily.

The final result were not exactly as planned. The survey took more time and because of complications in finding enough “treatment sites” that did not overlar in territory, we choose more Control sites and less treatment sites than planned.

- 29 days collecting data
- 3,784 buildings red, yellow and green
- 5,158 residences (1.36 per bldg)
- 1,928 in depth questionnaires (yellow and green houses only)
- 55 clusters (34 trtmnt, 21 cntrl)
- Data compounded daily and entered twice

Figure A6: Example of Selected Sample Point: Ave Christophe



5.6.4 Stage Four

After the data was completed Yves Francois Pierre, the co-team leader and a team of three surveyors returned and checked all sites, documented the GPS coordinates at four points to show the approximate cluster size.

Figure A7: Checked Coordinates




Figure A8: Example of a Cluster (Delmas 2)



6 Survey Instruments

6.1.1 Total Residential Building Occupancy List (TROL)

Supervisors compiled a list of all buildings in each cluster. The included building color code and whether or not the building or tent or provisional structure in the yard was occupied. The data was used along with variables gathered from the 25 buildings in the **Residential Building** questionnaire sample (such as time of MTPTC evaluations and information on general rubble removal) to create a more robust sample for testing the principal hypotheses (that MTPTC residential building evaluations and rubble removal encouraged re-occupancy of buildings).

6.1.2 Residential Building Questionnaire (RBQ)

- Person responsible: surveyors
- Respondents: The RBQ was applied to one resident in one half of all buildings sampled.(n = 1,800).
 - we defined the target respondent to be the building owner-resident
 - in the absence of the or a owner-resident, the surveyor was to interview a member of the owner-resident's family
 - in absence of a family member of the owner-resident, the surveyor interviewed a member of a renting family
 - the respondent was any member of the above defined residential units who were older than 15 years of age and responded to questions in a manner that seemed to the surveyors forthright and competent

6.1.3 The Neighborhood Profile Questionnaire (NPQ)

Person responsible: Co-Team Leader and Supervisors

Respondents: applied to all NPQ all clusters sampled (n = 36). Supervisor, at his or her discretion, selected a local school teacher, religious leader, or community organizer as a respondent.

Objective: To provide an overview of each neighborhood so that the data could be linked to information on individual residential buildings.

Target information: GPS coordinates, topography, water, electricity, sewage, trash pickup, NGO activity, rubble clearing assessment, estimation and description of amount/percentage of rubble cleared in neighborhood, nearest camp, businesses and significant sources of employment in the area.

The data was never codified or used in analysis.

6.1.4 *Key Informant Interviews (KII)*

Person Responsible: Co-team leader

Respondent: at his or her discretion, selected a local school teacher, religious leader, or community organizer as a respondent.

Objective: To corroborate and expand on NPQ data and to prepare for focus groups.

Target information: GPS coordinates, principal businesses and employment in the area, topography, water, electricity, sewage, trash pickup, history of neighborhood, rural connections, NGO activity, land tenure issues, do they have title, concerns about eviction, changes in rent cost land tenure, renter-tenant relations, do they have access to credit, would they use credit for residential building improvement, have they received any information on earthquake resilient housing, principal three problems in the neighborhood as well as solutions.

6.1.5 *Focus Groups*

Person Responsible: Co-team leader

Respondent: at his or her discretion, selected a local school teacher, religious leader, community organizer, and also groups comprised of people in camps versus not in camps.

Objective: To provide insight useful in the analysis of the quantitative data and to enrich the key informant data. Team co-leader captured information for which quantitative information was not necessary but can be readily garnered from discussion groups.

Target information: Impact of rubble clean-up and residential building structural evaluations, neighborhood conditions before and after the earthquake, coping strategies, gender and land tenure issues, (concerns about eviction, changes in rent cost, access to credit).

Sites and Participants: At 6 of the 54 sites (every 10th site); 6 people who had returned or who never left the neighborhood and 6 who were in the nearest camps.

6.2 BARR Total Resident Lists

6.3 BARR Residential Building Questionnaire

Note that the questionnaires were modified midway through the Port-au-Prince cluster survey. Modifications are provided in the following section/Annex.

ATANSYON

Anketè. Si pa gen moun ki pou repon ou; mete infomasyon nan Lis Kay Ki Pa Gen Moun avèk enfòmasyon ke vwazinay ka ba ou. Si apre sa, pran lòt kay la.

Prezantasyon

Na p fè yon etid pou yon seri òganizasyon ki te retire debri yo ak evalye kay yo. Anpil nan yo yon te gen ed USAID. Nou ta renmen poze w kèk kesyon sou kay la (bilding lan)

Non Respondan Non _____ Tel # _____

6 – 8.	6. Kouman l nan kay la	7. Sèks	8. Laj
Moun kap reponn lan, se?	1. Pwopriyetè ou fanmi...	1. Gason	_____
	2. Fèmme ou fanmi...		
	3. Vwazen.....		
	4. Moun kap pran swen kay la ou fanmi....	2. Fanm	
	5. Lòt repons		

9 - 10 Kisa chef kay la ap fè pou'l viv?	9. Fanm?	10. Gason?
	_____	_____
	1. = machann chita 2. = pwofesè 3. = komès 4. = salon 5. =	6. = boss 7. =manev 8. = taksi 9. = pwofesè 10. = pwofesyon 11. = lòt

11. Eske nou dòmi nan kay la, oubyen nou pase lajounen isit la sèlman ?	1 dòmi nan kay (Ale Q13)	2 lajounen selman	4 lòt _____	
12. Si nou pa dòmi nan kay la, kote nou dòmi?	1 kan	2 lòt kay	3 tant	4 lòt kote _____

PAJ DEBRI 1

13. Eske gen debri... kay kraze nan lakou a?	0 * Non <i>(Ale nan Q 15)</i>	1 Wi		
14. Jiska ki pwen debri a anpeche yon moun viv nan la kay la?				
Jiska ki pwen...				
1	2	3	4	5
Yon ti kras: Yon ti pil, ki pa anpeche abite la dan l	Pliz ou mwèn : Yon valè ki anpeche w antre la dan l, li nwi w	Yon anpèchman serye: Yon valè ki se yon Danje, fòk ou pase sou li pou antre nan kay la osinon pou w ale nan lakou a	Yon anpèchman trè serye : Yon vale ki fè ke ou pa preske ka antre nan kay la	Yon antrav tout bon : Yon vale kit tèlman anpil ke bilding nan merite kraze, lakou a ak kay la inaksesib,

15. <u>Eske te gen lòt debris ...</u> <u>kay kraze ke yo gen tan retire deja?</u>	0 * non <i>(Ale nan Q 18)</i>	1 wi
--	-------------------------------------	---------

16. Ki dat yo te retire debri yo?	_____ (mwa)
--	-------------

17. Jiska ki pwen debri a te anpeche yon moun viv nan kay la avan yo te retire l?				
Jiska ki pwen?				
1	2	3	4	5
Yon ti kras: Yon ti pil, ki pa anpeche abite la dan l	Pliz ou mwèn : Yon valè ki anpeche w antre la dan l, li nwi w	Yon anpèchman serye :Yon valè ki se yon Danje, fòk ou pase sou li pou antre nan kay la osinon pou w ale nan lakou a	Yon anpèchman trè serye : Yon vale ki fè ke ou pa preske ka antre nan kay la	Yon antrav tout bon : Yon vale kit tèlman anpil ke bilding nan merite kraze, lakou a ak kay la inaksesib

18. Kilès ki te retire debri nan Lakou a?	ONG				
	1 Pwopriyete	2 Lokatè	4 ONG <i>(Ale Q 20)</i>	8 konbit	Lòt repons _____
19. Konbyen sa te koute?	H\$ _____				
20. Si se konpayi ki retire debri yo nan lakou kiès nan yo?	ONG				

21. Si yo pat wete debri nan lakou a, eske ou te ka fè retire yo ou menm?	0 Non	1 Wi
--	----------	---------

PAJ DEBRI 2

22. Ki kote w/yo te mete debri ke yo retire nan lakou a?	1 Nan lari	2 Kamyon te pran ni tout swit	3 lòt _____				
23. Si yo pat konn retire debri ki nan lari yo, eskè ou m enm w t-ap retire debri pa-w yo pou w met nan lari a?	0 Non	1 Wi					
24. Ki konpayi ki retire debri ki te nan lari/lòt kote?	ONG						
	01 Toujou la	02 DAI	04 Chemonics	08 CWF	16 OIM	32 USAID	64 pa konnen
25. Eske ou te retounen nan kay la avan osinon apre yo finn retire debri yo?	1 Avan	2 Apre					
26. M ta renmen ou dim ki enpòtans debri yo retire nan lakou a genyen sou retou w nan kay la?	1. Pa enpòtan ditou 2. Pa enpòtan 3. Enpòtan 4. Enpòtan anpil 5. Enpòtan anpil anpil 6. Lòt repons						
27. E pou la ri a? M ta renmen ou dim ki enpòtans debri yo retire nan lari a genyen sou retou w nan kay la/sou?	1. Pa enpòtan ditou 2. Pa enpòtan 3. Enpòtan 4. Enpòtan anpil 5. Enpòtan anpil anpil 6. Lòt repons						
28. E pou lòt moun yo ? M ta renmen ou dim ki enpòtans debri yo retire a nan lari a genyen sou retou <u>lòt moun</u> <u>bò isi a</u> nan kay yo?	1. Pa enpòtan ditou 2. Pa enpòtan 3. Enpòtan 4. Enpòtan anpil 5. Enpòtan anpil anpil 6. Lòt repons						
29. Kote w te ale lè gudugudu (GG) a te finn pase ?	1* Pat deplase	2* andeyò	4* Kay fanmi, zanmi lan vil la)	8 Nan kan	16 Toujou nan kan	32 Lòt repons	

Si pat janm nan yon kan soti al nan paj 5

PAJ KAN

30. Kouman kan an rele?	_____
31. Konbyen tan ou te pase la?	_____ semèn
32. Eske ou toujou dòmi nan kan an ?	0. Non 1. Wi

Anketè pa li repons yo nan kesyon 21-23

33-35. Tanpri, Bay twa rezon ki te fè w ale rete nan kan?	
1. pat retire debri yo	1
2. gen dlo	2
3. gen kouran	3
4. gen latrin	4
5. pa gen okenn sèvis ditou	5
6. kan an pi bon	6
7. sekirite	7
8. yo bay manje	8
9. yo pè kay la	9
10. Free lodging	10
11. lòt repons (presize) _____	11

36. Depi kilè ou tounen nan kay la?	0 = nou poko tounen (Q40)	_____ Mwa
37-39. Poukisa ou te retounen nan kay la? (pran premye twa repons yo)	1. twòp bri/dezòd	
	2. kan an twò sal	
	3. kesyon sekirite	
	4. biznis la kay mwen, travay	
	5. m te pè pou pwopriyem	
	6. yo retire debri yo	
	7. gen lòt konstriksyon	
	8. marengwen	
	9. Chalè	
	10. lòt (ekri l.....)	

40-45. Ki kote sityasyon pi bon?		
Bagay yo	Katye a	Kan
40. Sekirite	1	2
41. Kouran	1	2
42. Dlo	1	2
43. Manje	1	2
44. Travay	1	2
45. Kote w santi ou pi pwoteje	1	2

PAJ KAY LA 1

Konbyen fanmi endepandan kay la genyen (moun ki rete nan menm pyès)?

46,51,56,61 Menaj a se, pwopriyete ou lokate, jeran o lot pwopriyete = 1, lokate=2 jeran = 3 lot = 4	Kantite moun nan menaj an		49,54,59,64 Konbyen ki mouri nan GG #	50,55,60,65 (Si se pa fanmi pwopriyete menm) Ki rapò lokate a genyen ak pwopriyete		
	47,52,57,62 Avan GG	48,53,58,63 Apre GG		Fanmi	Yo soti menm kote andeyo	anyen
				1	2	3
				1	2	3
				1	2	3
				1	2	3

PAJ KAY LA 2

66- 73. Kay la (si l kraze, mande enfòmasyon sou jan kay la te ye)	66. Konbyen etaj _____	
	Kantite chanm	67. Chanm a kouche _____
		68. Salon _____
		69. Lòt pyès _____
	70. Planche	1) beton simp 2) siman 3) seramik
	71. Tèt kay la:	1) Beton 2) Tòl 3) lòt repons _____
72. Mi kay:	1) Blòk simp 2) blòk krepri 3) bwa 4) Lòt repons	
73. Biznis	1) boutik 2) van dlo 3) materyo konstriksyon 4) kouti 5) lòt repons _____	

74-78. Konbyen lòt abri Ki genyen nan lakou a?	74.	75.	76.	77.	78.
	Tant	barak,anga, sheltè	Abri Improvize.	Tèt kay an beton	Tèt kay an tòl

79. Eske ou te konstwi lòt abri depi goudoudou a te finn pase?	0 Non (Ale Q 82)	1 wi		
80. Si se « Wi » Ki sa ou te fè kòm abri?	1 Tet kay siman	2 Tet kay tòl	4 Mi an bwa	8 Mi an blòk
81. Konbyen kòb ou te Depanse?	_____			
82. Eske ou pral fè yon lòt abri?	0 No	1 yes		

83. Di m sa-k empeche w bati kouniyè a?	1 Pa gen lajan	2 leta	3 m pè lòt gudugudu	Lòt rezon _____
--	-------------------	-----------	------------------------	--------------------

84. Ki moun ka p dòmi lan Tant yo?	01) Pèson
	02) Fanmi pwopriyete a
	04) Fanmi locate a
	08) Lòt repons _____

PAJ TPTC

85. Tcheke koulè MTPTC mete yo	Koulè MTPTC yo						
	0 pa genyen	1 vèt	2 Jòn	4 Rouj	8 Li efase	16 Rouj (lòt danje)	32 Lòt bagay
86. Eske ou ka di m, sa koulè yo vle di?			0 M pa konprann	1 Pliz ou mwen konprann	3 Konprann nèt		
87. Ki mwa TPTC te pase?				_____ mwa			

88. TPTC te mete koulè sou kay la avan ou te tounen osinon li te mete l apre ?		0 Avan	1 Aprè	
89. Eske mak TPTC te mete yo te ankouraje ou tounen ?		0 Non	1 wi	
90. Eske travay TPTC fè a te byen fèt ?		0 Non	1 wi	
91. Eske ou pra l repare kay la?		0 Non (Q93)	1 Wi (Q93)	3 M fè sa deja
92. Si se "3", Konbyen kòb ou t e depanse?		_____ (ale Q 97)		
93. Eskè w ka di'm ki reparasyon ki bezwen fèt?		0 Pa konprann	1 Pliz ou mwen konprann	3 konprann

94. Eske wap konstwi yon kay avèk tèt li an siman ankò?		0 Non	1 wi
95. Eske ou konn tande pale de lòt jan pou yo konstwi kay pou l pa tombe l ?		0 Non (Q97)	1 wi
96. Si wi, ki kote te aprann sa ?			

PAJ KESYON sou sa moun posede

97. Eske ou panse GG ka tounen ankò ?	1 M pa kwè sa ditou	2 M pa kwè	3 M pa konnen	4 Petèt	5 Wi la p tounen
--	------------------------	---------------	------------------	------------	---------------------

98. Ou panse ou konn sa pou w fè, pou kay la ka kenbe si ta gen yon GG ankò?	0 Non, pa konnen	1 Wi, konnen
---	---------------------	-----------------

99. Eske ou menm osinon fanmi ou posede kay la (kay la ki te la a)?	0 Non	1 wi	2 lokatè	3 Lòt repons
100. Eskè ou menm osinon fanmi ou posede tè kote kay la te ye ?	0 Non	1 wi	2 Lokatè	3 Lòt repons
101. Si wi, eskè nou gen papie pou sa ?	0 Non		1 wi	
102. Si wi, ki kalite de tit ?	1 Leta	2 Boukon	3 Reci	4 lòt
103. Eske w pè pèdi kay la osinon tè a, kòm ki dire pou pwopriyete osinon yon lòt moun ta pran l'?	0 Non		1 wi	

Obsèvasyon:

6.4 BARR Residential Building Questionnaire English Translation and Explanations

Definitions

Building/house: residential structure with one or more family units living inside.

Family unit:/residential unit any grouping of one or more people who a single rent or reside in the house under the custodianship of a payee(s) or owner(s).

New arrival: person who was not a household occupant before the earthquake.

Returnee: person who has returned to the house and is sleeping inside.

Rubble clearing: removal of debris from an area by an official organization or NGO.

Structural assessments: MTPTC house evaluations. Color-coded green (for safe to return), yellow (for damaged but habitable), and red (for damaged beyond repair).

/

1. Ques # _____ 2. Dat ___ / ___ 3. Cluster # _____ 4. Super # _____ 5. Interviewer # _____

Data in the header is necessary to identify the questionnaire, the location of the building and who asked the questions. The latter information is necessary to detect trends, bias and possible dishonesty in application of the questionnaire

Instructions

Surveyor, If there are no people in the house, refer to the Unoccupied Houses List. Gather the information from a neighbor. Continue to next house.

We will take the basic data on all houses that are unoccupied. This is necessary because we are studying return occupancy so among the most important information we can obtain is why people have not returned home.

Introduction

Hello. We are conducting a survey on the part of organizations that are paying to remove rubble and to evaluate houses in an effort to help people recover from the earthquake. We would like to ask you a few questions about your house/the building.

An explication of our activites and sponsors is ethical, necessary, and will be demanded from repondents in the field.

Respondent Name _____ Tel # _____

The purpose of respondent name and telephone is threefold: 1) to call and clarify missed information or, if necessary check on interviewer performance, 2) to encourage interviewer to be honest, 3) because many informants insist that the interviewer take contact information in case there the sponsoring organization want to provide assistance to him/her and the family.

6 – 8.	6. Who is he/she	7. Sèks	8. Age
The person who responds ?	1. Owner or family of...	1. Male	_____
	2. Renter or family of ...		
	3. Neighbor.....		
	4. Caretaker or family of....	2. Female	
	5. Other _____		

Questions 6-8 : Identifies the informant, sex, and age. This is allow test for responses dependent on characteristics of the person interviewer. For instance, are women more inclined than men to trust the MTPTC evaluations.

9 - 10	9. Female?	10. Male?
Occupation of hshld head?	_____	_____

Questions 9 – 10. Occupational status of the principal adults in the house, useful in creating socio-economic profile and testing for relationships and correlations. The question also captures ‘female headed household with no male partner present’ as well as ‘male headed households with no female partner present.’

11. Do you and your family sleep here in the house or yard?	1 domi nan kay		2 lajounen selman	
12. If no, where do you sleep	1 kan	2 lòt kay	3 tant	4 lot kote _____

Questions 11-12 Meant to determine status of home return. Have they returned to live in the home or are they only passing the day at the building/yard.

PAGE Rubble 1

13. Is there rubble ... destroyed house in the yard?			0 * Non <i>(Ale nan Q 13)</i>	1 Wi
14. To what degree does the rubble impede access to the home?				
Jiska ki pwen...				
1	2	3	4	5
Small: Some piles, does not effect habitation	Moderate: Impedes access, at nuisance level	Significant: Dangerous, must be crossed to access yard or house yard	Very Significant Yard and house almost inaccessible	Severe Building that needs to be demolished or yard and house totally inaccessible

Questions 13-14: Necessary to determine if rubble continues to be an impediment to household return.

15. Was there rubble... destroyed building in the yard but that has been removed?		0 * non <i>(Ale nan Q 16)</i>	1 wi
16. Date they removed rubble?		_____ (mwa)	
17. To what degree did the rubble impede access to the home?			
Jiska ki pwen?			
1	2	3	4
Small: Some piles, does not effect habitation	Moderate: Impedes access, at nuisance level	Significant: Dangerous, must be crossed to access yard or house yard	Very Significant Yard and house almost inaccessible
5 Severe Building that needs to be demolished or yard and house totally inaccessible			

Questions 13-14: Necessary to determine if rubble was an impediment to household return.

18. Who removed the rubble from the yard?	CLEARs avèk ONG								
	1 Owner	2 renter	4 NGO	8 konbit	Other _____				
19. How much did it cost?		H\$ _____		0 Pa aplikap					
20. If it was an NGO, which one?	ONG								
	01 Toujou la	02 DAI	04 Chemo nics	08 CWF	16 OIM	32 USAID	64 Leta/CN E	128 Goal	246 _____

Questions 18-20 Necessary to determine the role that USAID funded partners played in removing rubble, who those partners were, if other agencies or individuals were involved, and the extent to which participated, paid, and or took matters into their own hands.

21. If they did not take the rubble from the yard would you have been able to get it out yourself ?	0 Non	1 Wi	3 Pa aplikab
--	----------	---------	-----------------

Question 21. Meant to clarify the importance of USAID funded rubble removal programs to beneficiaries.

PAGE RUBBLE FOLLOW-UP

22. Where did they put the rubble they removed from the yard?	CLEARs avèk ONG			
	1 Street	2 Truck	3 _____	4 Pa aplikab
23. If they did not take the rubble from the street/other place would you have been able to get it out yourself ?	0 Non		1 Wi	3 Pa aplikab

Question 22. We want to make sure that we capture the benefits of taking rubble from the street and its relation to rubble removal from the yard.

24. What organization removed the rubble from the street?	CLEARs osinon ONG							
	01 Toujou la	02 DAI	04 Chemo nics	08 CWF	16 OIM	32 USAID	64 _____	128 Pa konnen

Question 24. Also meant to clarify the importance that USAID funded rubble removal programs to beneficiaries

25. Did you come back before or after they removed the rubble(either from the yard or the street)?	1 Avan	2 Aprè	3 Pa aplikab
---	-----------	-----------	-----------------

Question 25. Also meant to clarify the importance that USAID funded rubble removal programs to beneficiaries

26	1. Not important at all 2. Not important 3. Important 4. Very important 5. Very very important 6. Other	11 N/A
What level of importance did rubble removal from the <u>yard</u> have for you returning home from the camps		

Question 26. Also meant to clarify the importance that USAID funded rubble removal programs to beneficiaries

27	What level of importance did rubble removal from the <u>street</u> have for you returning home from the camps	1. Not important at all 2. Not important 3. Important 4. Very important 5. Very very important 6. Other	11 N/A
-----------	--	--	-----------

Question 27. Also meant to clarify the importance that USAID funded rubble removal programs to beneficiaries

28	Could you tell me the importance you think that rubble removal has <u>for other people</u> around here with respect to return home from the camps	1. Not important at all 2. Not important 3. Important 4. Very important 5. Very very important 6. Other
-----------	--	--

Question 28. Also meant to clarify the importance that USAID funded rubble removal programs to beneficiaries

29.	Where did you go after the earthquake?	1*	2*	4*	8	16	32
		nowhere	to the countryside	hosue o f family of friend in the city	camp	still in camp	other

Question 29. This question is meant as a filter : We want to know about those people who went to the camps and what helped to bring them home. Anyone respondent who went with family to a camp will respond to the questions on the following page.

It's relevance to our principal objective (determining impact of rubble removal and MTPTC evaluations on retournées) is to place these variables within a hierarchy of importance. The questions regarding the camps are also meant to help in understanding what should be done in the overall endeavor to encourage people to return to their homes.

PAGE CAMP

30. Name of the camp?	_____
31. How much time did you spend there?	____ semèn
32. Do you still sleep in the camp ?	0. Non 1. Wi

Questions 30-32 meant to provide a profule of how long home returnees spent in camps.

32-34. Give me three reasons why you went to the camp?	
1. rubble impeded access to the home	1
2. no water	2
3. no electricity	3
4. no latrine	4
5. no services at all	5
6. the camp is better	6
7 security	7
8. they were giving food	8
9. afraid of the house and another earthquake	9
10. Free lodging	10
11. other (specify)_____	11

Questions 32-34 Data to be used to place the importance of rubble into a hierarchy of reasons that people left homes.

35. When did you return to the bldg?	0 still in camp	_____ 24 _____ month	<input type="text"/>
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Questions 35. To provide a check on house return timing versus rubble removal and MTPTC house evaluations.

36-38. Why did you return to the house/leave the camp? (take the first three responses)	1. camp too noisy
	2. camp too dirty
	3. security
	4. business in home/work
	5. worried about property
	6. rubble removed
	7. built new structure
	8. other

Questions 36- 38 To indentify rubble removal and MTPTC house evaluations within a hierarchy of reasons that people returned home.

39-44.			
Your neighborhood vs Camp, which is better?			
	Katye a	Kan	Pa aplikap
39. Security	1	2	3
40. electricity	1	2	3
41. water	1	2	3
42. food	1	2	3
43. work	1	2	3
44. where to you feel you are best off	1	2	3

Questions 39-44 We believe that people who lived in Port-au-Prince prior to the earthquake, especially those who owned homes, prefer their neighborhoods to the camps. Demonstrating that this is true will emphasize the importance of helping people return to their homes. But we need data to demonstrate that. This question is meant to test the hypothesis.

PAJ KAY LA 1

How many indepent residential units are in the house (people who rent a room or rooms together)?									
45,51,57,63 Owner vs Renter Owner = 1, Renter =2	46,52,58,64 Where they living here before the EQ?		⇒ Si wi ⇒	How many people in the unit before vs after the EQ		49,55,61,67	50,56,62,68		
	Non	Wi		47,53,59, 65 Avan	48,54, 60,66 apre	How many died during the EQ #	What relation did the people have to the owner of the house/building	CAME from same rural area	nothing
	0	1					Family		
							1	2	3

Questions 45-68. This is a series of six questions that will be asked with respect to every family unit in the house before the earthquake versus now. Our goal is to demonstrate the difference between the number of people and residential units in the house before the earthquake versus those in the house now. We capture the difference between owners and renters. The latter we suspect have returned in much smaller numbers due to availability of land at Corrail.

Because we need to seperate out the number of people who died in the earthquake from those who did not return to the building for other reasons.

The fifth in this series of questions has to do with relations within the house. The purpose of this question is to determine the role that familiar relations play in landlord tenant relations in Port-au-Prince.. If--as stated by USAID Shelter Team consultants, most tenants are in fact family of owners, this data may help explain patterns of home retournees, particularly regarding those who opt to go or not go to Corrail.

PAJ KAY LA 2

69- 76. The house (if destroyed ask about the prior house)	69. Number of Floors		_____
	Rooms	70. sleeping rooms	_____
		71. Salon	_____
		72. other	_____
	73. Floor	1) cement rough 2) cement finished 3) ceramic	
	74. roof	1) cement 2) tin 3) other _____	
	75. walls:	1) block rough 2) block fini. 3) wood 4) other	
	76. business	1) store 2) sell water 3) construction material 4) sewing factory 5) other _____	

Questions 69 – 76 This series of 8 questions is principally intended as an indicator of socio-economic status. However, it will also give information that can be used as a cross check for number of renters by allowing use to correlate renters with house size and available number of rooms in the house.

77-81.	77.	78.	79.	80.	81.
Other structures in the yard?	Tent	T-shelter?	Improvised shelter.	house with cement roof	house with tin roof
	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Questions 77-81 We need to determine if, as in the case of totally destroyed homes, people are living on the premises in other structures. The reason for this is that USAID will consider people living on empty building sites but in tents or improvised shelters as people that may have benefitted from rubble removal and building assessments.

82. Have you built anything in the yard since the EQ?	0 Non	1 wi	
83. If yes, describe	1 cement roof	2 tin roof	4 wood walls 8 blookc walls
84. How much money did you spend?	_____		
85. Will you build anything (else) in the yard?	0 No	1 yes	

Questions 82-85 Data derived from this block of questions will allow us to demonstrate the degree to which returnees are disposed to invest in their property, an important consideration showing the relevance of rubble removal and house evaluations and a contribution for the understanding of the reconstruction effort as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter.

86 . What if anything is keeping you from building now?	1 lack of money	2 state reg.	3 fear of lot EQ	Other _____
--	--------------------	-----------------	---------------------	----------------

Question 86. Meant to determine the impediments to construction and, by corollary permanent return to building sites. Also meant as a contribution for the understanding of the reconstruction effort as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter.

87. Who sleeps in the tents?	01) No one
	02) Family of the owner
	04) Family of the renter
	08) Other _____
	16) N/A

Question 87. Intended to clarify whether tents are simply present or are being used as legitimate sleeping space. Many tents are simply on premises as a call for any possible aid. In most tests of the questionnaire respondents were forthcoming in saying whether or not they sleep in tents,

PAJ TPTC

88. Check the color of the MTPTC code	Color MTPTC code						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	green	yellow	Red	nothing	erased	Red (other danger)	other

89. Do you understand what the colors mean?	0 doesn't understand	1 more or less understands	3 doesn't understand at all
--	-----------------------------	-----------------------------------	------------------------------------

Questions 88-89 In order to demonstrate that the evaluations had an impact we must show that a) the house was evaluated and b) that residents understand what the colors indicate.

90. Date of assessment?	_____ mwa
--	-----------

91. Did you return to the house before or after the assessment?	0 before	1 After	2 N/A
--	-------------	------------	----------

Questions 90 – 91 To test our hypothesis that building evaluations encouraged returns, we must determine the timing of home return versus MTPTC household assessment.

92. Did the assessment encourage you to return to the house ?	0 Non	1 wi	2 N/A
--	----------	---------	----------

Question 92 We have tried to test the hypothesis with a simply demonstration of timing. Now we come right out and ask residents if the assessments encouraged them. No justification needed. We must assume that people can simply tell us if our hypothesis is correct with respect to their decision making process.

93. Will you repair the house?	0 Non	1 Wi	3 Done	4 N/A
94. If « 3 », how much money did you spend?	_____			
95. If « No, » do you know what repairs need to be done?	0 Doesn't understand	1 More or less understands	3 understands	

Questions 93 – 94 are meant to demonstrate the disposition of people and capacity of returnees to invest in their homes. This is important for our own hypotheses in that it allows us to show to what degree people value their homes and want to return to them and to remain there. It is of value to the reconstruction effort--as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter—because it will allow us to demonstrate to what degree people are financially capable of investing in their homes.

96. Will you construct with cement again?	0 Non	1 wi
--	----------	---------

Question 96 The data from this question is of high value to the reconstruction effort --as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter—because it will allow us to demonstrate to what degree people want to use cement versus alternative materials.

97. Have you heard of other ways to construct homes that are EQ resistant ?	0 Non	1 wi
98. If yes, where did you hear it?		

97 – 98 This question of value to the reconstruction effort -- as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter-- because it tells us to what degree we are educating the population with regard to alternative construction techniques.

Page: General Questions of Interest

99. Do you think that you know what to do to build a strong house?	0 Non, pa konnen	1 Wi, konnen
---	---------------------	-----------------

Question 99. Also mean to be of value to the reconstruction effort as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter. This is different that question 97 in that it reveals confidence and knowledge about construction in the absence of information provided by outside organizations. In pre-tests we have found that many people have not heard of new ways of reconstruction but local builders nevertheless believe they understand how to build back better.

100. Do you think that an EQ could occur again ?	1 M pa kwè sa ditou	2 M pa kwè	3 M pa konnen	4 Petèt	5 Wi la p tounen
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Question 99. This question is of general interest to all involved in planning for Port-au-Prince because it will give insight into what degree the members of the population are inclined to adapt to the possibility of another earthquake.

99. Eske ou menm osinon fanmi ou posede kay la (kay la ki te la a)?	0 Non	1 wi	2 lokatè	3 Lòt
100. Eskè ou menm osinon fanmi ou posede tè kote kay la te ye ?	0 Non	1 wi	2 Lokatè	3 Lòt
101. Si wi, eskè nou gen papie pou sa ?	0 Non		1 wi	
102. Si wi, ki kalite de tit ?	1 Leta	2 Boukon	3 Reci	4 lòt
103. Eske w pè pèdi kay la osinon tè a, kòm ki dire pou pwopryetè osinon yon lòt moun ta pran l?	0 Non		1 wi	

Questions 101 – 104 are also meant to be of value to the reconstruction effort as per October 4th IHRC Meeting on Housing Reconstruction and Transitional Shelter, these questions reaffirm or disprove what is being quoted found in other studies, that the land tenure system in Port-au-Prince, although largely informal, is stable and home and/or land owners have a strong sense of security regarding possession and hence are inclined to invest in homes and property.

6.5 BARR Neighborhood Infrastructure Profile

KESYONÈ POU DESKRIPSYON KATYE A

Non katye a _____

Kowòdone GPS 1) lonjitud 18 _____

2) latitud 72 _____

Kategori	Ran	Sous
3) Sekirite	0 1 2 3 4 5	1) ONG 2) Leta 3) Lòt
4) Elektrisite	0 1 2 3 4 5	1) ONG 2) Leta 3) Lòt
5) Dlo	0 1 2 3 4 5	1) ONG 2) Leta 3) Lòt
6) Fatra	0 1 2 3 4 5	1) ONG 2) Leta 3) Lòt
7) Lòt bagay _____	0 1 2 3 4 5	1) ONG 2) Leta 3) Lòt

ONG kap travay nan Zòn lan

ONG	Ki aktivite yo fè							
1)	Sante	manje.	debri	CFW	dlo	abri	asenisman	
2)	Sante	manje.	debri	CFW	dlo	abri	asenisman	
3)	Sante	manje.	debri	CFW	dlo	abri	asenisman	
4)	Sante	manje.	debri	CFW	dlo	abri	asenisman	
5)	Sante	manje.	debri	CFW	dlo	abri	asenisman	
	1	2	4	8	16	32	64	

Jiska ki pwen yo te wete debri yo?

Kategori	Ran	Sous
Debri	0 1 2 3 4 5	1) ONG 2) Leta 3) Lòt

Ki dat MTPTC te pase isti y make kay yo? Jou ____ Mwa ____

6.6 BARR Focus Group Guideline

Objective: To spontaneously capture the importance of rubble clean-up and household structural evaluations in the context of discussing the process, and how the earthquake and aid effort unfolded in different neighborhoods. We hope to capture any issues and the importance of those issues...

Number of focus groups: Eight selected from the 20 sites; chosen to be most representative of the different zones.

Selection: We will choose 6 people who have returned or who never left the neighborhood and 6 who are in the nearest camps.

People will be selected in collaboration with grass-root organizations in each neighborhood or camp and in talking with the key informants.

Questions/issues

- earthquake
 - what did the neighborhood look like before the earthquake?
 - worse hit areas?
 - what were the biggest changes in daily life that have come about as a consequence of the earthquake?
 - what was the community reaction, where did people go? how did they go? With who? Why?
 - at what moment did people begin to come back to the neighborhood?

{ If rubble clean-up and household structural evaluations are not spontaneously discussed then we will pursue the issue by asking specifically about the impact. }

- gender issues:
 - Who is more inclined to move back to the neighborhood,
 - women versus men? Who is more likely to make the decisions?
- land tenure
 - concerns about eviction (do they have title)
 - changes in rent cost land tenure
 - access to credit, conditions (sabotay, kout ponya)

6.7 Residential Building Questionnaire (English)

As Modified Midway through Cluster Survey

(Changes highlighted)

Instructions

Surveyor, If there are no people in the house, refer to the Unoccupied Houses List. Gather the information from a neighbor. Continue to next house.

Introduction

Hello. We are conducting a survey on the part of organizations that are paying to remove rubble and to evaluate houses in an effort to help people recover from the earthquake. We would like to ask you a few questions about your house/the building.

Non Respondan Non _____ Tel # _____

6 – 8.	6. Who is he/she	7. Sex	8. Age
The person who responds ?	1. Owner or family of...	1. Male	_____
	2. Renter or family of ...		_____
	3. Neighbor.....		_____
	4. Caretaker or family of....	2. Female	_____
	5. Lòt repons _____		_____

9 – 10 Occupation of hshld head?	9. Female?	10. Male?
	_____	_____

11. Do you and your family sleep here in the house or yard?	1 Sleep in hs	2 Daytime only	4 other	
	_____	_____	_____	

12. If no, where do you sleep	1 camp	2 Other house	3 tent	4 other place
	_____	_____	_____	_____

M pral poze kek ti kesyon sou afe sa k te pase apre GuduGudu

13 -21. What was the biggest problem for you and your family had immediately after the earthquake ?		
13. finding water	0	1
14. getting electricity	0	1
15. getting the rubble out of the yard	0	1
16. getting the rubble out of the street	0	1
17. finding a toilet/bathroom	0	1
18 security/crime	0	1
19. finding food	0	1
20. finding a place to sleep	0	1
21.other _____	0	1

PAJ DEBRI 1

22. Is there rubble ... destroyed house in the yard?	0 * Non <i>(Ale nan Q 13)</i>	1 Wi								
23. To what degree does the rubble impede access to the home?										
Jiska ki pwen...										
1	2	3	4	5						
Small: Some piles, does not effect habitation	Moderate: Impedes access, at nuisance level	Significant: Dangerous, must be crossed to access yard or house yard	Very Significant Yard and house almost inaccessible	Severe Building that needs to be demolished or yard and house totally inaccessible						
24. Was there rubble.... destroyed building in the yard but that has been removed?			0 * non <i>(Ale nan Q 16)</i>	1 wi						
25. Date they removed rubble?		_____ (mwa)								
26. To what degree did the rubble impede access to the home?										
Jiska ki pwen?										
1	2	3	4	5						
Small: Some piles, does not effect habitation	Moderate: Impedes access, at nuisance level	Significant: Dangerous, must be crossed to access yard or house yard	Very Significant Yard and house almost inaccessible	Severe Building that needs to be demolished or yard and house totally inaccessible						
27. Who removed the rubble from the yard?		CLEARs avèk ONG								
		1 Owner	2 renter	4 NGO	8 konbit	Other _____				
28. How much did it cost?		H\$ _____			0 Pa aplikap					
29. If it was an NGO, which one?		ONG								
		01	02	04	08	16	32	64	128	246
		Toujou la	DAI	Chemonics	CWF	OIM	USAID	Leta/CNE	Goal	_____
30. If they did not remove the debirs in the yard could you have done it yourself?			0 Non		1 Wi					

PAJ DEBRI 2

31. Where did they put the rubble they removed from the yard?	CLEARs avèk ONG								
	1 Street	2 Truck	3 _____	4 N/A					
32. If they did not take the rubble from the street/other place would you have been able to get it out yourself ?				0 No		1 Yes		3 N/A	
33. What organization removed the rubble from the street?	CLEARs osinon ONG								
	01 Toujou la	02 DAI	04 Chemo nics	08 CWF	16 OIM	32 USAID	64 _____	128 Don't know	
34. Did you come back before or after they removed the rubble(either from the yard or the street)?				1 Before		2 After		3 N/A	
35. If you did not remove the rubble from the yard could you have come back to live in the house ?				0 No		1 Yes			
36. What level of importance did rubble removal from the <u>yard</u> have for you returning home?									
1		2		3		4		5	
No importance at all		No importance		Important		Very important		Very Very Important	
37-45. Comparing moving the rubble out of the yard with other problems that you had after the earthquake, what was more important?							RR	The other problem	
37. finding water							1	2	
38. getting electricity							1	2	
39. finding a toilet/bathroom							1	2	
40 security/crime							1	2	
41. finding food							1	2	
42. Finding a house							1	2	
43. Finding work							1	2	
44. Finding money to borrow							1	2	
45 lòt repons (presize)_____.							1	2	

<p>46.</p> <p>What level of importance did rubble removal from the <u>street</u> have for you returning home ?</p>	<p>1. Not important at all 2. Not important 3. Important 4. Very important 5. Very very important 6. Other</p>	<p>11 N/A</p>
--	---	--------------------

PAJ DEBRI 3

<p>47.</p> <p>Could you tell me the importance you think that rubble removal has <u>for other people</u> around here with respect to returning home</p>	<p>1. Not important at all 2. Not important 3. Important 4. Very important 5. Very very important 6. Other</p>
---	---

<p>48.</p> <p>Where did you go after the earthquake?</p>	<p>1*</p> <p>nowhere</p>	<p>2*</p> <p>to the countryside</p>	<p>4*</p> <p>hosue o f family of friend in the city</p>	<p>8</p> <p>camp</p>	<p>16</p> <p>still in camp</p>	<p>32</p> <p>other</p>
--	--------------------------	-------------------------------------	---	----------------------	--------------------------------	------------------------

<p>49.</p> <p>How many weeks passed before you came home?</p>	<p>0 = We have not returned yet (Q40)</p>	<p><u> </u> weeks</p>
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Si pat janm nan yon kan soti al nan paj 5

PAJ KAN

50. Name of Camp	
51. How many weeks were you there?	___ ___ weeks

Surveyor, do not read questions 52-57

52-54. Give me three reasons why you went to the camp?	
1. rubble impeded access to the home	1
2. no water	2
3. no electricity	3
4. no latrine	4
5. no services at all	5
6. the camp is better	6
7 security	7
8. they were giving food	8
9. afraid of the house and another earthquake	9
10. other (specify) _____	10

55-57. Why did you return to the house/leave the camp? (take the first three responses)	1. camp too noisy
	2. camp too dirty
	3. security
	4. business in home/work
	5. worried about property
	6. rubble removed
	7. built new structure
	8. other

PAJ KAY LA

58- 65. The house (if destroyed ask about the prior house)	58. Number of Floors		_____
	Rooms	59. sleeping rooms	_____
		60. Salon	_____
		61. other	_____
	62. Floor	1) cement rough 2) cement finished 3) ceramic	
	63. roof	1) cement 2) tin 3) other_____	
	64. walls:	1) block rough 2) block fini. 3) wood 4)other	
65. business	1) store 2) sell water 3) construction material 4) sewing factory 5) other _____		

66-70. Other structures in the yard?	66. Tent	67. T-shelter?	68. Improvised shelter.	69. house with cement roof	70. house with tin roof
	—	_____	_____	_____	_____

71. Who sleeps in the tent(s)?	01) No one
	02) Family of the owner
	04) Family of the renter
	08) Other _____

72. Have you built anything in the yard since the EQ?	0 Non	1 wi	
73. If yes, describe	1 cement roof	2 tin roof	4 wood walls 8 blookc walls
74. How much mone it cost?	_____		
75. Will you build anything (else) in the yard?	0 No	1 Yes	
77. Eske w tap konstwi yon kay avèk tèt li an siman ankò?	0 Non	1 wi	
76. What is preventing you from building now	1 No money	2 state	3 Fear EQ 4 Other

PAJ TPTC

78. Have you heard of new ways to build ?				0 Non (Q97)		1 wi	
79. Si yes, where ?	1 course	2 radio	3 television	4 Word/mouth	5 internet	6 school	7 newspaper

80. Check the color of the MTPTC code	Color MTPTC code						
	1 green	2 yellow	3 Red	4 nothing	5 erased	6 Red (other danger)	7 other

81. Date of assessment?	_____ mwa
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82. Did you return to the house before or after the assessment?	0 Before	1 After	2 N/A
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83. Can you tell me what the colors mean?	0 Does not understand	1 More or less understands	3 Understands perfectly
--	--------------------------	-------------------------------	----------------------------

84. Do you know what repairs need to be done?	0 Doesn't understand	1 More or less understands	3 understands
--	-------------------------	-------------------------------	------------------

87. In your opinión, were the evaluations well done ?	0 Non	1 wi
--	----------	---------

88. Did the assessment encourage you to return to the house ?	0 Non	1 wi	2 N/A
--	----------	---------	----------

89. And if they did not evaluate the house would you have returned when you did?	0 Non	1 wi
---	----------	---------

PAJ KESYON sou sa moun posede

90. Do you think that an EQ could occur again ?	1 No way	2 Doubt it	3 Don't know	4 maybe	5 For sure
91. Do you or your family own the house?	0 Non	1 wi	2 lokatè	3 Lòt repons	
92. Do you or your family own the land?	0 Non	1 wi	2 Lokaè	3 Lòt repons	
93. Do you have a title ?	0 Non	1 wi			
94. Are you afraid of losing the land or the house to another person or the owner taking it away ?	0 Non	1 wi			

I would like to ask you some questions about the neighborhood and organizations here?

95. How long have you lived here ?	_____ane	
96. Do you participate in church or religious meetings ?	0 non	1 wi
97. Do you participate in school meetings ?	0 non	1 wi

98. Do you participate in neighborhood meetings?	0 non	1 wi
99. Do you participate in political meetings?	0 non	1 wi
100. Are you are member of a cooperative?	0 non	1 wi
101. If yes, what is the name of the cooperative	0 non	1 wi
102. If yes, did you join the cooperative before or after the earthqulpake ?	1 anvan	2 apre

6.8 Residential Building Questionnaire (Creole)

As Modified Midway through Cluster Survey

ATANSYON

Anketè, Si pa gen moun ki pou repon ou; mete enfòmasyon yo nan Lis Kay Ki Pa Gen Moun avèk enfòmasyon ke vwazinay ka ba ou. Apre sa, pran yon lòt kay la.

Prezantasyon

Na p fè yon etid pou yon seri òganizasyon ki te retire debri yo ak evalye kay yo. Anpil nan yo yon te gen ed USAID. Nou ta renmen poze w kèk kesyon sou kay la (bilding lan)

Non Respondan Non _____ Tel # _____

6 – 8.	6. Kouman l nan kay la	7. Sèks	8. Laj
Moun kap reponn lan, se?	1. Pwopriyete ou fanmi...	1. Gason	_____
	2. Fèmye ou fanmi...		
	3. Vwazen.....		
	4. Jeran	2. Fanm	
	5. Lòt repons _____		

9 – 10 Kisa chef kay la ap fè pou'l viv?	9. Fanm?	10. Gason?
	_____	_____

11. Eske nou dòmi nan kay la, oubyen nou pase lajounen isit la sèlman ?	1 dòmi nan kay (Ale Q13)	2 lajounen selman	4 lòt _____	
12. Si nou pa dòmi nan kay la, kote nou dòmi?	1 Kan	2 lòt kay	3 tant	4 lòt kote _____

M pral poze kek ti kesyon sou sa k te pase apre GuduGudu

13 -21. Ki sa k te 3 Pi Gwo pwoblem nou jis apre GuduGudu a te finn pase (pran twa (3) repons)?		
13. jwen dlo	0	1
14. jwen kouran	0	1
15. retire debri yo nan lakou a	0	1
16. retire debri yo nan lari a	0	1
17. jwen latrin	0	1
18. sekirite	0	1
19. jwen manje	0	1
20. jwen kote pou domi	0	1
21. lòt repons (presize) _____	0	1

PAJ DEBRI 1

22. Eske gen debri... kay kraze nan lakou a?					0 * Non (Ale nan Q 15)	1 Wi
23. Jiska ki pwen debri a anpeche yon moun viv nan la kay la?						
Jiska ki pwen...						
1	2	3	4	5		
Yon ti kras: Yon ti pil, ki pa anpeche abite la dan l	Pliz ou mwen : Yon valè ki anpeche w antre la dan l, li nwi w	Yon anpèchman serye: Yon valè ki se yon Danje, fòk ou pase sou li pou antre nan kay la osinon pou w ale nan lakou a	Yon anpèchman trè serye : Yon vale ki fè ke ou pa preske ka antre nan kay la	Yon antrav tout bon : Yon vale kit tèlman anpil ke bilding nan merite kraze, lakou a ak kay la inaksesib,		

24. <u>Eske te gen lòt debris ...</u> <u>kay kraze ke yo gen tan retire deja?</u>					0 * Non (AL NAN 37)	1 wi
--	--	--	--	--	---------------------------	---------

25. Ki dat yo te retire debri yo?	_____ (mwa)
--	-------------

26. Jiska ki pwen debri a te anpeche yon moun viv nan kay la avan yo te retire l?						
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Jiska ki pwen?						
1	2	3	4	5		
Yon ti kras: Yon ti pil, ki pa anpeche abite la dan l	Pliz ou mwen : Yon valè ki anpeche w antre la dan l, li nwi w	Yon anpèchman serye :Yon valè ki se yon Danje, fòk ou pase sou li pou antre nan kay la osinon pou w ale nan lakou a	Yon anpèchman trè serye : Yon vale ki fè ke ou pa preske ka antre nan kay la	Yon antrav tout bon : Yon vale kit tèlman anpil ke bilding nan merite kraze, lakou a ak kay la inaksesib		

27. Kilès ki te retire debri nan Lakou a?	ONG				
	1 Pwopriyetè	2 Lokatè	4 ONG (Ale Q 29)	8 konbit	Lòt repons _____

28. Konbyen sa te koute?	H\$ _____
---------------------------------	-----------

29. Si se konpayi ki retire debri yo nan lakou kiès nan yo?	ONG

30. Si yo pat wete debri nan lakou a, eske ou te ka fè retire yo ou menm?	0 Non	1 Wi
--	----------	---------

PAJ DEBRI 2

31. Ki kote w/yo te mete debri ke yo retire nan lakou a?	1 Nan lari	2 Kamyon te pran ni tout swit	3 lòt _____					
32. Si yo pat konn retire debri ki nan lari yo, eskè ou menm w t-ap retire debri pa-w yo pou w met nan lari a?	0 Non	1 Wi						
33. Ki konpayi ki retire debri ki te nan lari/lòt kote?	ONG							
	01 Toujou la	02 DAI	04 Chemonics	08 CWF	16 OIM	32 USAID	64 pa konnen	128 _____
34. Eske ou te retounen nan kay la avan osinon apre yo finn retire debri nan lakou a?	1 Avan			2 Apre				
35. E si nou menm osinon lòt moun pat retire debri nan lakou a, eske ou te ka retounen nan kay la ?	0 Non			1 Wi				
36. Pou nou ka konpran sa byen, m ta renmen ou dim ki enpòtans debri yo retire nan lakou a genyen sou retou w nan kay la?								
1	2	3	4	5				
. Pa enpòtan ditou	Pa enpòtan	Enpòtan	Enpòtan anpil	Enpòtan anpil anpil				

37-45. Lè ou konpare debleye lakou a avèk lòt pwoblèm nou te genyen apre GuduGudu a, sa k te pi impòtan pou nou?	Deble-ye	Lòt pwoblèm	Touledè igual
37. jwenn dlo.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
38. jwenn kouran.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
39. jwenn latrin.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
40. sekirite.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
41. jwenn manje.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
42. jwenn kay.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
43. jwenn djòb.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
44. jwenn kob pou prete.....osinon debleye?	1	2	3
45. lòt repons (presize)_____.	1	2	3

46. E pou la ri a? M ta renmen ou dim ki enpòtans debri yo retire nan lari a genyen sou retou w nan kay la?				
1	2	3	4	5
. Pa enpòtan ditou	Pa enpòtan	Enpòtan	Enpòtan anpil	Enpòtan anpil anpil

47. E pou lòt moun yo? M ta renmen ou dim ki enpòtans debri yo retire a nan lari a genyen sou retou <u>lòt moun</u> <u>bò isi</u> a nan kay yo?	1. Pa enpòtan ditou 2. Pa enpòtan 3. Enpòtan 4. Enpòtan anpil 5. Enpòtan anpil anpil 6. Lòt repons
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48. Kote w te ale lè gudugudu (GG) a te finn pase ?	1* Pat deplase	2* andeyò	4* Kay fanmi, zanmi lan vil la)	8 Nan kan	16 Toujou nan kan	32 Lòt repons
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49. Kobyen semen w te fe deyo?	0 = nou poko tounen (Q...)	— semen
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Si l pat janm nan yon kan ale nan paj 6

PAJ KAN

50. Non kan an	
51. Konbyen tan ou te pase la?	____ semèn

Anketè pa li repons yo nan kesyon 52-57

52-54. Tanpri, Bay twa rezon ki te fè w ale rete nan kan?	1. pat retire debri yo	1
	2. gen dlo	2
	3. gen kouran	3
	4. gen latrin	4
	5. pa gen okenn sèvis ditou	5
	6. kan an pi bon	6
	7. sekirite	7
	8. yo bay manje	8
	9. yo pè kay la	9
	10. pa bezwenn peye kay	10
	11. lòt repons (presize) _____	11
55-57. Poukisa ou te retounen nan kay la? (pran premye twa repons yo)	1. twòp bri/dezòd	1
	2. kan an twò sal	2
	3. kesyon sekirite	3
	4. biznis la kay mwen, travay	4
	5. m te pè pou pwopriyem	5
	6. yo retire debri yo	6
	7. gen lòt konstriksyon	7
	8. marengwen	8
	9. Chalè	9
	10. lòt (ekri l.....)	10

58- 65. Kay la (si l kraze, mande enfòmasyon sou jan kay la te ye)	58. Konbyen etaj		
	Kantite chanm	59. Chanm a kouche	_____
		60. Salon	_____
		61. Lòt pyès	_____
	62. Planche	1) beton simp 2) siman 3) seramik	
	63. Tèt kay la:	1) Beton 2) Tòl 3) lòt repons _____	
	64. Mi kay:	1) Blòk sinp 2) blòk krepè 3) bwa 4) Lòt repons	
65. Biznis	1) boutik 2) van dlo 3) materyo konstriksyon 4) kouti 5) lòt repons _____		

1. No _____ 2. Dat ____ / ____ 3. Grap _____ 4. Super _____ 5. Intèviouè _____

PAJ KAY LA

66-70. Konbyen lòt abri Ki genyen nan lakou a?	66. Tant	67. barak,anga, sheltè	68. Abri Improvize.	69. Tèt kay an beton	70. Tèt kay an tòl

71. Ki moun ka p dòm lan Tant yo?	01) Pèson
	02) Fanmi pwopryetè a
	04) Fanmi lokate a
	08) Lòt repons _____

72. Eske ou te konstwi lòt abri depi goudoudou a te finn pase?	0 Non (Ale Q 75)		1 wi	
73. Si se « Wi » Ki sa ou te fè kòm abri?	1 Tet kay siman	2 Tet kay tòl	4 Mi an bwa	8 Mi an blòk
74. Konbyen kòb ou te Depanse?	_____			
75. Eske ou pral fè yon lòt abri?	0 No		1 yes	

76. Di m sa-k empeche w bati kouniyè a?	1 Pa gen lajan	2 leta	3 m pè lòt gudugudu	Lòt rezon _____
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77. Eske w tap konstwi yon kay avèk tèt li an siman ankò?	0 Non		1 wi				
78. Eske ou konn tande pale de lòt jan pou yo konstwi kay pou l pa tombe l ?	0 Non (Q80)		1 wi				
79. Si wi, ki kote te aprann sa ?	1 Sem.	2 radyo	3 televizn	4 teledjol	5 internet	6 lekol	7 journal

PAJ TPTC

80. Tcheke koulè MTPTC mete yo	Koulè MTPTC yo						
	0 pa genyen	1 vèt	2 Jòn	4 Rouj	8 Li efase	16 Rouj (lòt danje)	32 Lòt bagay

81. Ki mwa TPTC te pase?	_____ mwa
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82. TPTC te mete koulè sou kay la avan ou te tounen osinon li te mete l apre ?	0 Avan	1 Aprè
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83. Eske ou ka di m, sa koulè yo vle di?	0 M pa konprann	1 Pliz ou mwen konprann	3 Konprann nèt
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84. Eskè w ka di'm ki reparasyon ki bezwen fèt?	0 Pa konprann	1 Pliz ou mwen konprann	3 konprann
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85. Eske ou pra l repare kay la?	0 Non (Q87)	1 Wi(Q87)	3 M fè sa deja
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86. Si se "3", Konbyen kòb ou t e depanse?	_____
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87 Eske travay TPTC fè a te byen fèt ?	0 Non	1 wi
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88. Eske mak TPTC te mete yo te ankouraje ou tounen ?	0 Non	1 wi
--	----------	---------

89. E si yo pat evalue kay la, eskè w tap tounen lè w te tounen?	0 Non	1 wi
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PAJ KESYON sou sa moun posede

90. Eske ou panse GG ka tounen ankò ?	1 M pa kwè sa ditou	2 M pa kwè	3 M pa konnen	4 Petèt	5 Wi la p tounen
91. Ou panse ou konn sa pou w fè, pou kay la ka kenbe si ta gen yon GG ankò?	0 Non, pa konnen		1 Wi, konnen		
92. Eske ou menm osinon fanmi ou posede kay la (kay la ki te la a)?	0 Non	1 wi	2 lokatè	3 Lòt repons	
93. Eske ou menm osinon fanmi ou posede tè kote kay la te ye ?	0 Non	1 wi	2 Lokatè	3 Lòt repons	
94. Eske nou gen tit pou sa	0 Non		1 Wi		
95. Eske w pè pèdi kay la osinon tè a, kòm ki dire pou pwopryetè osinon yon lòt moun ta pran l?	0 Non		1 Wi		

Kounye a, mwen pral poze kesyon sou Katie ak òganizasyon

96. Konbyen tan w gen nan katye-a ?	_____ane	
97. Reyinyon gwoup legliz ou byen òganizasyon relijye?	0 non	1 wi
98. Reyinyon asosyasyon paran nan lekòl ou byen kolèj?	0 non	1 wi
99. Reyinyon komite amelyorasyon pou kominote a (Asosyasyon Kominotè)?	0 non	1 wi
100. Reyinyon asosyasyon politik?	0 non	1 wi
101. Eske ou se manm yon asosyasyon osinon gwoupman nan zon lan?	0 non	1 wi
102. Si wi, kouman l rele.....	0 non	1 wi
103. Si wi, li fet anvan o apre GG ?	1 anvan	2 apre

104. Eskè gen moun nan kay la partisipe nan Cash for Work ?	0 non	1 wi	
27. Kilès ki bay li?	1 Leta	2 ONG	Lèt repons _____

7 Annex: Qualitative Field Reports

Yves Francois Pierre

7.1 The case of Bel Air

7.1.1 *History of the area*

Bel air is one of the oldest area in PauP ; it is known as an old bourgeois and middle class neighborhood throughout the nineteenth century. With the extension of the city, during the first quarter of the 20th century, the bourgeoisie left the area to occupy other quarters; ordinary people started setting in. Still the presence of a few well known intellectuals and political figureheads will turn the neighborhood into a political bastion. Belair is known to have been heavily involved in politics particularly with the election of 1957. Following the rise of the Duvalier régime in 1957, the neighborhood lost many of its residents because it supported another candidate who was forced into exile after he became a 19-day interim president. The degradation of the neighborhood will finally turn it mainly into a popular political reservoir. In 1990, a large proportion of the area was pro Lavalas and at the demise of the Aristide régime in 2004, Bel air became an outlawed area harboring many of the bandits who had participated in the 'Bagdad Operation', a lot of residents left the area.

7.1.2 *Significant characteristics that make the area different than other areas*

Bel Air had in the past many national political figures. According to local informants, such a past added generates a sense of pride among its residents. In their view, there exists a community in Bel Air marked by a sense of solidarity and friendship among many of the families. Bel Air residents tend to consider the area as more open and even superior to other 'shanty towns' because in part of the many landmark institutions that exist in the area. However, residents still complained about the social stigmatization of which they are victims: outsiders perceive them as being vagrant.

7.1.3 *Change in Population before/after earthquake*

After the quake, there is still the same climate of fraternity and openness among the residents. The social composition of Bel Air population has changed because residents have accommodated ex-prisoners who were set free by the earthquake. Residents complained of their incapacity to launch the daily commercial activities they used to carry out as well as their lack of control over youngsters.

7.1.4 *Problems and solutions*

As in other areas, unemployment is rampant. Training of the youth as truck and heavy machinery drivers, and mechanic can help alleviate this problem as the country will be going through a phase of reconstruction. Women should be given a privileged position on the labor market as they can care for children from different fathers as opposed to men who dispatch their

money to many women living in different quarters. Water is rare, poorly distributed and expensive; the water system is broken.

7.1.5 Family in camp versus in neighborhood

As opposed to life in the neighborhood, camp life is marked by a lack of privacy, much promiscuity, rape, and infectious diseases. Hope and despair are quite common since in the view of camp residents nothing is being done to alleviate their lots.

7.1.6 NGO presence and activities

In addition to support professional training for youngsters and anti violent activities, Viva Rio was also involved in rubble removal. CONCERN works on anti violence via dialogues and among diverse sectors of the population. DINEPA was doing cash for work and sanitation. MINUSTAH helped removed the rubble as well as CHEMONICS, IOM, PADF/PROPEDUR/CROPODEP, and CHF.

7.1.7 Building standards knowledge and information about earthquake resilient housing

Residents understood the meaning of TPTC marks via gossip not via any formal diffused knowledge. Nothing is known about resilient housing.

7.1.8 Housing and Land tenure status

Most of the families in Bel Air are homeowners although many of them have moved out of the area which was declared as a 'red zone' in 2004. Land insecurity has never been an issue.

7.1.9 Credit

Residents have no access to credit. Sabotaj and sol exist (mostly among the merchants) besides usurious loan (up to 20-25% per month). There is a local social association which extends very tiny credit to merchants (less than 2000 gourdes) at the rate of 8% from funds raised among its active members, some of these live in the diaspora.

7.1.10 Local associations: presence and dynamics

7.1.10.1 Assessment of the impact of RR on IDPs

Although a substantial number of Bel Air residents actually shuttle between their homes and Champ de Mars following RR, many local residents complained about the insufficiency of RR in Bel Air, particularly in 'rue Tiremasse'. The latter maintained that most of it was carried out in the streets by voluntary local residents and CNE and do not provide sufficient access to the homes for IDPs to return. The relationship between RR and IDPs return is lurking.

7.1.10.2 Dynamics of local associations in Bel Air

Bel Air has mostly two types of associations which dated before the earthquake: political associations and/or movements, and social associations, mostly engaged in humanitarian actions but without external support. Among the first ones figure: MOPAM¹, OPEP², MOM³, MOSSOH⁴; among the second ASEP⁵, KOREBEL⁶. Members of these associations left to

¹ Mouvman Pwogresis pou Avansman Mass yo, with senator John Joel Joseph as an important leader.

² Organisation pour le progrès du Bel Air

³ Mouvman Mass Popilè

⁴ Mouvman pour la Surveillance de la Société Haitienne

⁵ Association des Ecoles Privées du Bel Air

⁶ Konbit pour Rebati Bel Air

become camp committees in order to have control over the proceeds of international aid (particularly in Solino)

Members of local associations claimed that Bel Air did not benefit any cash for work from the NGOs because it is still considered as a red zone. They felt excluded both from the State and NGOs cash for work programs and maintained that their impact has been insignificant with respect to IDPs return. Apparently, no organizations benefited 'Ayiti pap peri' but only some political figureheads who distributed the teams among their peers. This strategy has generated much alienation among members of the local associations, to such extent that they described Bel Air as an area with no real organization per se, but with a few political figureheads monopolizing all incoming proceeds to their tiny advantages.

Bel Air is an area with potentially a lot of social capital. In spite of financial difficulties, local social association such as KOREBEL has implemented a popular restaurant and a primary school, and extended small credits to market women from small funds collected from the members, some of whom live outside of Haiti. Actually, KOREBEL is having serious difficulty continuing its activities due to lost of logistics registered during the earthquake.

7.2 The case of Portail Léogane

7.2.1 History of the area

Portail Léogane is the southern limit of Port-au-Prince city; the Northern being Portail St Joseph. In order to mark off the city from its rural hinterland, right after the independence the Haitian State implemented gates usually with army station as gatekeepers. All appears as if the state wanted to circumscribe those city residents who could have access to its few services and institutions versus those who could not. Portail Léogane has always been used as a terminal for all travelers coming from the Southern peninsula. The area has become populous under the Duvalier régime because political connections with the government allowed people to have access to its land, most of it being state land.

7.2.2 Significant characteristics that make the area different than other areas

Portail Léogane use to be a 24-hour recreational area for Port-au-Prince residents. The political events of 2004 have turned the area into a quasi 'red zone' where all kinds of violence and banditry were occurring although its residents claimed that such events were not endogenous to the area. Actually, it is a terminal for the Southern peninsula with a PNH station which has replaced the army post since the dissolution of the Haitian Army in 1995. Kosovo was the catchword used to characterize the area after the fall of Aristide from power in 2004. Local residents say that whereas other areas have specific moments to be hot, Portail Léogane has no predicted time for death occurrence. In other words, one can find death there any moment.

7.2.3 Change in Population before/after earthquake

Local residents observe a willingness from people of high educational status to carry out low level jobs after the earthquake. One reason for that is the extension of poverty and misery; another is that many people lost to the earthquake those who used to support them materially. The distribution of the aid has generated much frustration with state and NGO officials.

Fear, trauma are common consequences of the earthquake particularly among children.

The area actually is hosting victims from different parts of Port-au-Prince city.

7.2.4 *Problems and solutions*

Residents complained about insecurity and poor sanitation due to the presence of the bus terminal. The bus station attracts bandits from 'Village de Dieu' located nearby. There is a lack of irrigation canals and drainage, and no electricity.

7.2.5 *Family in camp versus in neighborhood*

As in other sites, residents complained about the lack of intimacy of camp residents.

7.2.6 *NGO presence and activities*

IOM has worked in road pavement; PADF helped with canal drainage and cleanliness and food kits. CHEMONICS was engaged in RR (via the 'Mairie') particularly in schools, hospitals.

7.2.7 *Building standards knowledge and information about earthquake resilient housing*

Residents have no knowledge about resilient housing but about building standards because leader of a local organization has explained the meaning of the color code via megaphone

7.2.8 *Housing and Land tenure status*

.Most residents are home renters; the homeowners are living elsewhere. There is no problem of land insecurity.

7.2.9 *Credit*

As in most of the other sites, Portail Léogane residents have no access to credit but organized informal credit associations such as sol (especially among merchants)

7.2.10 *Local associations: presence and dynamics*

7.2.10.1 *Assessment of the impact of RR on IDPs*

Most of the RR works carried out in the area by NGO have been done in specific sites such as schools, and hospitals. Local residents put out a lot of voluntary work to help one another with rubble removal. Residents complained about not benefiting cash for work teams because Portail Léogane is not perceived as a hotspot. They thought most people started coming back to the neighborhood before CHEMONICS carried out its RR activities.

7.2.10.2 *Dynamics of local associations in Portail Léogane*

There is a paramount local organization in Portail Léogane by the name of 'Le Conseil des Quartiers de Portail Léogane'. This council regroups some thirty organizations and was created under the instigation of the Port-au-Prince mayor in January 2009, after the earthquake. However, ACCES-H7, GRPL8, AHDS9, and OPOLD10 figure among those organizations which existed long before the earthquake. The council actually works in partnership with the Mayor office to carry out sanitation, road maintenance, and pavement. Most of the surrounding camp committees were put in place by the Council. The Mayor office has no means actually to help out the Council.

Parallel to the Council, one finds an anemic pro Lavalas organization, KBFLP11, with no political influence because its leader was killed in 2006 in a conflict between 'Baz Pilat' of which he was a member and 'lame ti manchèt', a rival political organization. . Since then, the

7 Accès des Citoyens Concernés pour l'Evolution Sociale d'Haiti

8 Gwoupman Refleksyon Portail Léogane

9 Association Haitienne de Développement Social

10 Organisation de Portail Léogane pour le Développement

11 Koòdinasyon Baz Fanmi Lavalas Plis

organization has been reduced to a few chieftains (called 'Gran Oryan') with no real political connection.

Both organizations lack political connections to 'bring' large scale cash for work jobs to Portail Leogane. As a result, the cash for work organized by the Mayor office ('An nou leve kanpe') with CHEMONICS was rather thin and circumscribed and benefited just a few. The Council lost an opportunity to participate in other cash for work organized by CHEMONICS with the Mayor office during March/April 2010 because 'Ayiti pap peri' started working in the neighborhood that CHEMONICS planned to carry out the RR. Local residents said that CHEMONICS just pull out leaving them with no jobs because one area cannot have the same interventions from two 'NGOs'. One of the Council leader declared that 'Ayiti pap peri' is made of a bunch of thieves and thugs with no supervision whereas PADF 'Ann Leve Kanpe' work organized through the Mayor office is serious and has supervisors

Name of informant :Bel.An

Committee: CORSIPG (Comité de Revendication du Site de la Place Cathédrale)

Position in Camp Committee: Speaker (in French, Porte-Parole)

Location : Camp Place Cathédrale/**Bel Air**

Date : Saturday Feb.26, 2011

Most of the Bel Air people flew to Champ de Mars (a public park) during the Goudou Goudou (GG),. They staid there for two months until the Ministry of Interior gave out 'tent vouchers?' as incentives to those who wanted to leave because Champ de Mars was overcrowded. There was a lot of reticence because Place Cathedral was perceived as a hot area. Those of us who were most deprived in Champ de Mars accepted to leave. They were not all from Bel Air, however....

Place Cathedral (PC) actually has 200 families with an average of 5 persons per family in a tent. Of those whose house was impacted 70% are from Bel Air; at least another 10% of homeowners whose house was not destroyed are from Bel Air: they sleep in the camp but moved out during the day to take care of their everyday business.

Some residents of PC think GG is due to an explosion that occur while the Americans was carving out an under sea tunnel that will link Miami, Porto Rico and Haiti

Others see it as an end-of-the-world religious warning that exists also in the Bible.

7.3 The case of Delmas 32

7.3.1 *History of the area*

Residents maintained Delmas 32 is state land that the population occupied after the fall of the Duvalier régime in 1986. It is only long after squatters have occupied the site that they went to the Mayors office to evaluate their home and to DGI to pay their dues.

7.3.2 *Significant characteristics that make the area different than other areas*

Favorable business area, very opened. Located at cross roads of 4 communes: Delmas, Tabarre, Pau P and Pétion Ville. High accessibility.

7.3.3 *Change in Population before/after earthquake*

Before quake, there was mutual help among residents against personal adversities (sickness, death), which lasted for short time after quake. Nowadays, they had become more wicked and selfish. 12

7.3.4 *Problems and solutions*

Focus on lack of services, such as water and electricity, place in markets so that life can come back again in the area. Lack of capital is fundamental. There is a great need to get financial help to reinforce existing business or to start anew

7.3.5 *Family in camp versus in neighborhood*

Camp life is promiscuous, no respect for others; children are exposed to all kinds of utterances

7.3.6 *NGO presence and activities*

PADF has been engaged in CFW;

GRET was involved in CFW and in putting pure water with CAMEP;

JP in RR

7.3.7 *Building standards knowledge and information about earthquake resilient housing*

TPTC standards are understood but a minority according to local informants is still leaving in red houses provided the roof is thin

7.3.8 *Housing and Land tenure status*

The majority of residents were home renters. Land has no title as it is state land. Land security is not a major problem: it is socially guaranteed.

7.3.9 *Credit*

Access to credit has declined sharply as a result of loss due to earthquake. Merchants complained about not having enough cash to organize 'sol'. Cash gained from CFW was not enough they had to supplement it. Some have access to usurious loans ('kout ponya') at a rate of 20 to 25%. Those who have shops have access to SOGESOL which uses valuable household items as collaterals

12 A leader said: Mutual aid exists only on death occasion, whenever there is 'international money around', your death won't be my concern

7.3.10 *Local associations: presence and dynamics*

7.3.10.1 *Assessment of the impact of RR on IDPs return*

There is a general agreement that RR has facilitated IDPs return among the non-displaced and the returnees both after RR and Building Assessment. Some said they went back home before RR was over because of fear of theft and the difficulties of life in a camp; others because for them building assessment generated real hope that the State was going to provide them with new housing.

Those in camp 'Nan Bannan' could not provide any information on the topic, as most of them seemed to be still there. They complained about the fact they had nowhere to go since their houses were totally destroyed and they had no work. They did not benefit CFW since they don't have a committee to 'defend' them. They had a great urge to be relocated since they occupied a private yard and the homeowners are pressuring them to leave.

7.3.11 *Dynamics of local associations in Delmas 32*

Delmas 32 presents a typical case of a site where fights over goods, services and even ideologies exacerbated relations among the diverse types of associations. One finds in Delmas 32 three types of associations: community-based organization: PEPDEL 3213, COPRODEP¹⁴, pro Lavalas associations (ROFALADEL¹⁵, RAMIDEL¹⁶) and the 'ad hoc' post quake camp committees such as the 'notab' association (CRD¹⁷).

PEPDEL 32 the oldest organization dated back from 1995 and was involved in a GRET/CAMEP

7.4 **The case of Carrefour Feuilles**

7.4.1 *History of the area*

Workers from Leogane, Jacmel, and mostly Barradères settled in the area to participate in the construction of the hotel Castel Haiti at the beginning of the American occupation in 1915. Up to 1997, the area was still bushy and relatively empty. Anarchic construction started with Aristide return in 1994.

7.4.2 *Significant characteristics that make the area different than other areas:*

residents know one another and are concerned with improving their neighborhood;

no division between zones on political or drug issues as opposed to Martissant

high self esteem of the population ; the youth is interested in promoting itself through education and professional schooling;

13 Projet d'Eau Potable de Delmas 32

14 Conseil du Projet de Développement communautaire Participatif en milieu urbain, created in 2009

15 Regroupement des Militants de Fanmi Lavalas created en 2004 after Aristide departure

16 Rassemblement des Militants de Delmas created in 2001

17 Coordination Réponse de Delmas, a committee created after the earthquake

7.4.3 *Change in Population before/after earthquake*

Before quake, there was more dialogue between residents; they had become more violent due to stress;

Many families are 'broken', which sets the youth freer from family constraints; as a consequence, early pregnancy...

Residents are more concerned now with how to build anti earthquake houses;

Residents are more prone to participate in workteams to improve their locality across class levels whereas before it was done more by local organizations.

7.4.4 *Problems and solutions*

Unemployment is high. Solutions: implement mid level professional schools and then increase access to credit so that people can start their own business

7.4.5 *Family in camp versus in neighborhood*

Camp is anonymous, no real links between residents. Sanitation conditions are poor. More sharing spirit, respect, control over one's children when living in the neighborhood.

7.4.6 *NGO presence and activities*

IOM has been engaged in CFW and shelters;

CHEMONICS in RR;

ACF in curing ravines

7.4.7 *Building standards knowledge and information about earthquake resilient housing*

Standards are known but TPTC did not explain; no information about resilient housing but awareness through community 'gossip'

7.4.8 *Housing and Land tenure status*

The majority of the residents were owners of their houses not of the land. No fear of eviction; most occupants are long-time renters on the land they got from the 'gérants¹⁸'. The land owners are absentees¹⁹. Cost of land renting is higher for new occupants as compared to before quake.

7.4.9 *Credit*

Before earthquake, residents could use CECASH, KOTELAM, SOGESOL. Financial donation from OXFAM allowed many residents to still have access to those sources. Other outlets to credit are obtained via 'kout ponya' with a rate of 20% to 25% a month. Sol and sabotaj exist only among merchants. Credit will not be used for household improvement but to start a business, 'although school fees might absorb some of the capital'

¹⁸Guardians of the land

¹⁹ Some absentee landowners name are: Dimanche, Saieh, Bien-Aimé, Dorcé

7.4.10 *Local associations: presence and dynamics*

7.4.10.1 *Dynamics of local associations in Carrefour Feuilles*

Carrefour Feuilles has two different sets of associations: what we may call community development based organizations and neighborhood based local committees. The majority of the former dated before the earthquake, contrary to the latter. Local organizations such as CAED (Centre d'Aide aux Enfants Démunis), created three years ago in 2008 as a non political organization, has worked in partnership exclusively with IOM in its CFW program. ASD an equally community-based pre earthquake organization not only has benefited not only shelters' construction from IOM but also governmental CFW program 'Ayiti pap peri'²⁰. On the contrary, the community-based organization OJEB (Organisation des Jeunes de Baillergeau), created since 1995 has been involved in environmental protection; anti violence training, garbage control, and water project with GRET/CAMEP. OJEB has done CFW with diverse NGOs (Chemonics, ACF, PCI...) while they refused to participate in 'Ayiti pap peri'. According to a local leader, community-based organizations in Carrefour Feuilles are so 'grass-rooted', that 'Ayiti pap peri' went to search for their support, so that the tension that can exist between organizations due to political line did not take place in Carrefour Feuilles. Overall, most community based organizations preferred to benefit CFW from NGOs. One local resident voiced that 'Ayiti pap peri' is for people who have no social standing.

7.4.11 *Local Assessment of IDPs returnees as a result of Building*

7.4.11.1 *Assessment and Ruble Removal*

In general both displaced and non-displaced groups agreed that BARR had an impact on IDPs return to their 'home' although the displaced insisted more on property ownership as a factor that eased the return. As far as change in daily life is concerned, among the latter group in camp (Place Jérémie) the focus tended to be on stress, psychological trauma and deprivation, feeling of abandonment²¹ whereas out of camp it was on post quake material and leisure deprivation, family dislocation.

7.4.11.2 *The dissolution of the Baillergeau Camp: a success story?*

What stands more in Carrefour Feuilles is the story of a camp, the 'Baillergeau Camp' which no longer exists 6 months after the earthquake. Such a 'success' is due largely to the neighborhood committees and OJEB, under the leadership of Widelson Pierre Louis²². We present briefly the steps that lead to the camp 'absorption' by the surrounding community'. The camp was located on a soccer field and harbored some 156 families. Most of them were owners of a piece of land nearby where their home was located. After CFW and RR took place, OJEB and the committees have convinced most of the camps residents to go back to their home. Here is how they proceeded:.

²⁰ 'Ayiti pap peri' was organized mostly for electoral purpose in favor of the presidential candidate of the Party Inite. Participants had to give their CIN (Carte d' Identification Nationale) to be hired. The work performed in Brédy street by local residents was so light that they said that if someone uses such easy money to buy food and does not vote for Célestin s/he will get a stomach ache. In local language 'Gade yon kòb Célestin fè nou fè! Si yon moun pa vote Célestin, kòb sa a ap fè vant li fè l mal'

²¹ Camp residents talked about people being frequently hyper, stressed...non residents talked about no more disco, children whom they cannot afford to send to school

²² An HRI (Haiti Recovery Initiative Program) Coordinator/Chemonics.

1. OJEB and community participants including house owners destroyed total all red houses with team works paid by CHEMONICS
2. Looked for tents they put in place of houses from CORDEAID with the help of GRET. Obtained 150, about one per family. Added provisory shelters on land for renters with agreement of landowners
3. Negotiation with camp residents for their return to their original settings (their home location). This involves: explanation of the importance of the field for the community, motivation to abandon camp life; tent distribution on the basis of a list of camp residents.
4. Got ACF to keep providing purchase cards to families after they left;
5. The minority of 'spoilers' (who has implanted shelters on the field) got pressure from the youth to leave.
6. After the great majority of residents had left, OJEB allowed about 15 families to stay momentarily on another property of its own. Those families are not residents of the area.

7.5 The case of Delmas 2

7.5.1 *History of the area*

Local informants date the social formation of Del 2 to the era of Magloire before 1957. The land belongs to the state and the Duvalier government declared it of public utility on Feb 28, 1978 after waves of people started occupying it. A fire of 1982 destroyed all the houses and EPPLS23 replaced them.

7.5.2 *Significant characteristics that make the area different than other areas*

Del 2 is well known for its handicraft and art (candles, shoes, mahogany, paintings, 'sculpture'). The earthquake unfortunately destroyed the Center which offers training to its residents. Del 2 is known for its participation in Carnaval Parade and also for its political loyalty to the Lavalas régime. The area has seen a lot of political violence marked by the struggle between two groups: Scie à métaux (pro Lavalas) et Dan Fè (anti Lavalas). The area is heavily populated with spoilers²⁴.

7.5.3 *Change in Population before/after earthquake*

After the quake, some residents of la Saline and Cité Soleil came to Delmas 2 mostly in Parc la Paix and Place la Paix

7.5.4 *Problems and solutions*

There are lots of talented people and no jobs. Local residents think it will help to make its cultural know to the public through parade and 'foire'

7.5.5 *Family in camp versus in neighborhood*

In camp, mutual help is more salient (exchange of food, reciprocal help in building tents) but lack of control of the children. A lot of family conflicts because of rape.

7.5.6 *NGO presence and activities*

CONCERN has implemented sanitation program before earthquake and common dialogues between various sectors. Viva Rio has done work in sanitation and peace building. Since earthquake, Oxfam has had a financial program with market women. The Salvation Army and also World Vision helped with tents

7.5.7 *Building standards knowledge and information about earthquake resilient housing*

Building standards are known not through TPTC; lack knowledge about resilient housing

7.5.8 *Housing and Land tenure status*

The land belongs to the state. Squatters set in. Physical space is socially guaranteed. However, throughout the Duvalier régime, chieftains used to collect rent from residents under the name of the state. A substantial majority of homeowners; renters were common as local residents added stories to EPPLS home.

7.5.9 *Credit*

Sabotaj and usurious loan up to 20-25% per month are quite common as well as pawn shops.

23 Entreprises Publiques Pour Logements Sociaux

24 In local lexicon: 'Gwo Ponyèt' who are not 'zenglendo' but believe in using force to get advantages.

7.5.10 Local associations: presence and dynamics

7.5.10.1 Assessment of the impact of RR on IDPs

Both the non-displaced and displaced complained about lack of access to cash and hunger since the earthquake. The non displaced retrace residents return to their 'home' to heavy rains and rubble removal. For them solidarity is organized around adversities not around economic needs. The displaced in Parc la Paix focused about the discomfort of camp life, the threat of cholera.

7.5.10.2 Dynamics of local associations in Delmas 32

In Delmas 2, one also finds different types of associations as in other sites. Some of them are community development oriented, such as KDSM²⁵, AQSN²⁶; others are straightforward political: ROC²⁷, Baz Kameroun; socio political MOPOJES²⁸; or cultural, such as KGKDES²⁹.

KDSM, created in 1996, regroup about twelve local associations. As one of most important organization in Delmas 2, it has been working in partnership with CONCERN on violence reduction and conflict resolution; health motivation against MST; capacity building both of individuals through Haiti Tech. and organizations, and CFW after the earthquake. KDSM has also launched a latrine project with PADF and BID.

After the earthquake, NGOs working in Del 2 have implemented CFW through partnership with non political associations while co-opting the spoilers. Baz Cameroun and other political leaders benefited teams from state program 'Ayiti pap peri'.

Life in Del 2 is not only organized around community development association but also around 'baz', one of the most famous being 'Baz Kameroun'. There is a political culture marked by strong clientelism which subsumes a large part of community life. Leaders of Baz Cameroun complained about their exclusion from NGOs program and declared they will not give away the country to NGOs. They wish more collaboration between the State and NGOs for the country's development.

25 Kolektif pou Devlopman St Maten

26 Association Des Quartiers de St Martin

27 Rassemblement des Organisations pour le Changement

28 Mouvement des Jeunes pour le Progrès de St Martin

29 Konbit Guinen Kreyòl pou Devlopman St Maten

8 Annex: Analysis of BARR Qualitative Case Studies

Yves Francois Pierre

General Outline:

Sources of Information and Methodology

Earthquake Effects

BARR Effects

Dynamics of Local Associations

Annexes

8.1 Analysis of BARR Qualitative Case Studies

The following analysis is based on a qualitative case studies of seven clusters located in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince³⁰: Delmas 32, Delmas 2, Bel Air, Carrefour Feuilles, Portail Léogane, Rue Joseph Janvier, and Nerrette. Those selected sites are not meant to be representative. The selection is based on my own personal knowledge of Port-au-Prince city. Those cases should help illustrate problems faced by victims of the earthquake and the resource strategies they used to respond to them as they were chosen on the northern and southern edge of the city and in Pétion Ville. The dynamics of the organization in those case studies follow the potential conflict pattern found in Ravine Pintade³¹ between politically oriented organizations and developmentally oriented organizations. The analysis is organized around four basic themes: the sources of information, the earthquake effects, the BARR effects and the dynamics of local associations.

8.2 Sources of Information and Methodology

The empirical information was collected through focus interviews with key informants and local groups. The key informants were local influentials (religious leaders, school teachers, leader of organizations), the local groups were represented by groups of non displaced and displaced victims of the earthquake, and local associations committees both political and non political. Many members of the groups were affiliated to local organizations.

Two general criteria were retained to form the displaced and non displaced groups: 1) participants should not be leaders of organizations; 2) the participants should have at least five years of residence in the neighborhood. The first criteria was retained to avoid bias in the interviews: on the one hand, participants might not want to reveal in certain cases their thoughts in front of local leaders; and, on the other, they might rely too much on what the leaders will say. The second criteria was chosen because we wanted to collect data about participants'

³⁰ One of the site (Nerrettes) actually is in Pétion Ville

³¹ Ravine Pintade was used as a pilot study

perceptions of change of life strategies, such as access to credit, land issues, problems of the neighborhood after the earthquake...

Although the clusters have different social history, the qualitative data collected on them suggest the crosscutting and specific conclusions. The former has to do with the impact of the earthquake and the BARR effects; the latter with the dynamics of local associations. Thus, the following is structured around these three issues.

8.3 Earthquake Effects

As a natural disaster, the earthquake triggers violation of basic human and environmental rights. Whole sets of people got killed, displaced and uprooted from their neighborhoods. Their home got destroyed in large part because of the inability of the Haitian State to enforce existing construction norms and standards. Historically, city residents in Haiti had to get permission from the Mayor's office to implement a construction. Although such requirement still exists, it has started loosing ground since the Duvalier era. The country has lapsed over the last 50 years into a breakdown of both its social and legal normative framework. Nowadays, people can build anywhere even around ravines without respecting the minimum distances between residential buildings. A look at PauPrince from one of its hills can easily give proof of such assertion. As a result of such construction disorder, many more people got hit by the earthquake.

Still after the earthquake, on all the sites residents mentioned there is no information being officially disseminated regarding those norms. As a result, many red houses are reoccupied after slight repair. Even for the yellow houses, there are no State suggestions as to how they should be repaired. According to local leaders, Nerrette was the site where this happened more frequently. On the other hand, Portail Léogane and Carrefour Feuilles represented the neighborhoods where presumably it happened less because local leaders made explicit attempts to diffuse information about post-earthquake quality of housing following the MTPTC evaluation.

The earthquake has a 'totalizing effects' on Port-au-Prince residents' life because it affects all aspects of people life. Such effects can be captured on different planes: economic, social and psychological.

8.4 Economic effects

A great change/alteration of life sustaining activities can be observed on all sites. Residents rescaled their activities to fit the loss or lack of capital. The money gathered by those who participated in Cash For Work (CFW) was put to consumption essentially. The following descriptions of shift of activities of some members of a displaced group in Bel Air can help illustrate the case in point:

J. R. was a night gown sewer before the Goudou Goudou (GG). She used to sell in the Marché Tèt Boeuf market (located downtown Port-au-Prince). Since the GG, she has been leaving in the Place Cathedral Camp selling small breakfast made of bread, peanut butter and coffee. In the same vein, M F A. shifted from selling cloth to friends to making small sandwiches which she claimed do not bring much money in since customers walked away without paying their credit.

Access to credit has become more limited since the earthquake both for merchants and business owners because residents have gone through great lost of collaterals (homes, in-

house valued items). Lack of cash did not allow them to reorganize informal rotating credit associations on the same scale as before earthquake. These associations exist mostly among those who need quick cash to start or maintain a business, merchants, motorcyclists, etc.

In summary, there is an extension and an intensification of poverty. Another woman of the same group talked about such poverty in front of the others in the following terms:

One cannot do any longer what one uses to do. One gets disturbed by news over the radio, news of Goudou Goudou. You need to buy something, you don't have the means to do so....Many people are fallen down because they are physically weak...You don't know when you will be able to get out of this situation...You would like to rent a home, you don't have the means. You are obliged to accept state assistance and you don't even see how and when State assistance will be forthcoming...

8.5 Social Effects

In all cases studied, residents described their neighborhood as a community (katye-a, zòn lan). There is a sense of belongingness, cherished values and contacts (like being more peaceful, more interdependent than others), of common 'assets' they shared (their skills, economy, cultural patrimony). Residents on all sites idealized their former way of life, the images they have of their neighborhood. Of course, the earthquake has destroyed much of it; and residents hope life will go back to 'normalcy' one day. Most residents grieve for employment as the only way to change their status of 'useless earthquake victims' into reconstituted social and economic actors.

Community dislocation has been noted as a prime social consequence of the earthquake.

Not surprisingly, there is a large preference for life in one's neighborhood as opposed to life in a camp among residents. Life in the neighborhood is less anonymous; more prestigious. The immediate post earthquake climate of mutual help in basic necessities (food, water, tent installation) and adversities (sickness) in camp life tended to vanish and be replaced by a climate of promiscuity, disrespect, loss of control over one's children due in part to the incapacity of parents to respond to their needs.

School teachers on most of the sites reported of not having been able to collect school fees from families. Families complained of not being able to send their children to schools. Such social consequence confirm the above economic 'crisis' in view of the fact that being the major channel of social and economic mobility in Haiti schooling has drawn from all types of families most of their revenues as investments for the future.

Another consequence is the weakening of social hierarchy. Adults complained of the disrespect that youngsters have manifested towards them as opposed to the days of their youth and insisted 'things' have gotten worse since the earthquake.

In addition to the material lost they incurred, they also complained about the lost of support network. Many residents lost those to whom they could turn in case of adversities; a loss of 'social capital' which limits even more their access to loans, food, or even clothing.

There was a shared feeling of abandonment manifested by many facts. First of all, no sites reported having received a visit from State officials. Second, none had any idea about the possibility of resettlement. Finally, they shared the feeling that the Haitian State will not put to use the capacities of their localities so that 'business' can be back to its pre-earthquake 'normalcy'. Such assertion, for instance, is due to lack basic services (electricity, water, place in open markets) in Delmas 32; lack of marketing of their handicraft products in Delmas 2; lack of job markets for middle ranked professionals in Carrefour Feuilles.

NGO material and sanitary assistance also fueled the feeling of total abandonment by the State among residents on all sites. Actually, most of them complained of not having access to any CFW (NGO or State-driven). A tendency which gets confirmed by the quantitative study: overall only ten percent (10%) of all residents declared having at least one member of their household engaged in CFW. The State advocating strategy of implementing CFW instead of food aid in order to protect national production lacks convincing evidence.

8.6 Psychological Effects

Correlatively, there was much stress and aggressivity at an individual level due to a change of space and in space where people are used to organize their life both socially and culturally. The aggressivity was due to a density of interactions because most space became overcrowded with unknown people. This pattern occurred particularly in the camps but also out camps where neighborhood residents complained of people's presence from all social roots they had not know before.

Also, both camp residents and non residents a general loss of self-esteem as a result of the earthquake due to incapacity of parents to respond to children needs, or to sexual abuse, or prostitution. Cases of teen age pregnancy and prostitution have been reported by respondents of almost all sites.

8.7 BARR Effects

BARR effect on returnees was perceived overall as being positive. A strong majority of informants declared that the displaced went back home after rubble removal and building assessment took place. The effect of building assessment seems to be less important than that of rubble removal. However, some reported other factors such as bad weather, disgusting life conditions in camp have pushed them to go back home before RR.

Many displaced residents, however, were pulled by the need to reconstitute their environment and the need to benefit from external assistance coming either from NGOs or the State. The acquisition of a lodgment was their main concern. As a result: some of them went home during the day and slept at night in the camp; members of the same household ended up putting separate tents in the camp in order to increase their chance at getting eventual assistance.

In spite of all difficulties to relocate earthquake victims, Carrefour Feuilles as a site shows the story of a camp ('Baillergeau Camp') which no longer exists 6 months after the earthquake. Such a 'success' is due largely to negotiations among the neighborhood committees, the OJEB (Organisation des Jeunes de Baillergeau)³² and the help and incentives provided by various NGOs to the victims, who for the most part were owners of their home and land located in the area (See Annex IV for details).

8.8 Local Association Dynamics

Ceteris paribus, the dynamics of local organizations affects neighborhood participation in RR program. More specifically, whenever organizations have contacts, they increase their chance of participating in CFW, of having RR taking place in their neighborhood. Three types of contacts exist: NGOs, National State apparatus and local state authorities (mayor's office) relations. The more actors have non-redundant contacts, the better their chance of getting CFW/RR for their neighborhood.

By and large, there was potential conflict between local associations which benefit NGO-driven CFW and local associations which benefit State-driven Ayiti pap peri. The conflicts are deeply rooted in the difference in structure, self perception and orientation of these two types of associations. The following box presents a synthesis of these two types of associations:

Local associations geared toward neighborhood development usually have an elected committee, active and non active members whom they recruit among 'decent people' in their localities. They perceived themselves as non political but as being representatives of their collectivity and worked for its development.

Whereas local associations geared toward access to State benefits perceived themselves as being political, have de facto chiefs and followers whom they recruit usually among the downtrodden, the underdogs. They tend to develop and maintain political contact with political 'patrons' and look for benefits mostly for their peers

On the whole, politically-based local associations feel largely excluded by NGO socially-based development organization from all benefits and resent deeply such exclusion.

Local association dynamics around cash for work and other benefits found different expressions on the sites depending on social, political history of the organizations. As such, those organizational dynamics were specific to their context. Below, we present a short summary of

³² Under the leadership of Widelson Pierre Louis An HRI (Haiti Recovery Initiative Program) Coordinator/Chemonics.

those dynamics on different sites as illustrations. For more details, readers can skim through the empirical cases located in the Annexes.

Delmas 32 presents a typical case of a site where fights over goods, services and even ideologies exacerbated relations among the diverse types of associations. Delmas 32 harbored a conflict between NGO partner associations, the Notabs and the prolavalas RAMIDEL (Rassemblement des Militants de Delmas)³³. COPRODEP as a political organization work exclusively with various NGO/CFW teams as RAMIDEL who benefited exclusively teams from the state program Ayiti pap Peri complained of not getting anything from the NGOs (Annex I).

Delmas 2 and Bel Air have mostly organizations that are predominantly political. They are frustrated and angry at NGOs because they feel excluded from all benefits. After the earthquake, NGOs working in Delmas 2 have implemented CFW through partnership with non political associations while co-opting the spoilers. Baz Cameroun and other political leaders benefited teams from state program 'Ayiti pap peri'. Leaders of Baz Cameroun complained about their exclusion from NGOs program and declared they will not give away the country to NGOs (See Annexe II).

Members of local associations claimed that Bel Air did not benefit any cash for work from the NGOs because it is still considered as a red zone. They felt excluded both from the State and NGOs cash for work programs and maintained that their impact has been insignificant with respect to IDPs return. Apparently, no organizations benefited 'Ayiti pap peri' but only some political figureheads who distributed the teams among their peers (see Annex III).

In Carrefour Feuilles, there was no 'open' conflict among organizations. According to a local leader, community-based organizations in Carrefour Feuilles are so 'grass-rooted', that 'Ayiti pap peri' went to search for their support, so that the tension that can exist between organizations due to political line did not take place in Carrefour Feuilles. Overall, most community based organizations preferred to work CFW from NGOs. One local resident voiced that 'Ayiti pap peri' is for people who have no social standing (see Annex IV for details).

Portail Léogane has a Neighborhood Council which worked mostly with the Mayor Office to benefit CFW. One finds an anemic pro Lavalas organization, KBFLP³⁴, with no political influence because its leader was killed in 2006 in an intergroup conflict. Both organizations lack political connections to 'bring' large scale cash for work jobs to Portail Leogane. The Council lost an opportunity to participate in other cash for work organized by CHEMONICS with the Mayor office during March/April 2010 because 'Ayiti pap peri' started working in the neighborhood that CHEMONICS planned to carry out the RR. One of the Council leader declared that 'Ayiti pap peri' is made of a bunch of thieves and thugs with no supervision whereas PADF 'Ann Leve Kanpe' work organized through the Mayor office is serious and has supervisors (see Annex V for details).

Nerrette is one area where there is very little associational life. Nerrette has one social organization and no political association, but some political figurehead trying to help the victims.

³³ See case studies in Annex for a detailed presentation

³⁴ Koòdinasyon Baz Fanmi Lavalas Plis

Thus, for rubble removal, it was through the mayor that residents got some teams of CFW. In the same vein, DINEPA implemented four fortnights there following a Senator's intervention (See Annex VI for details).

The site of Joseph Janvier is unique as a case: there, life is dominated by the Dumerlin Camp committee who is involved in politics. The non native committee benefited money to put together teams of 'Ayiti pap peri' but recruited people from elsewhere. Actually, the local association (RENOHDD35) has put together a political coalition, called Block 50, in an attempt to draw necessary political contacts which can allow the organization to benefit some gains in the future. They are actually in search for an influential leader to break the yoke of the State they consider as 'a gang' (See Annex VII for details).

Annex: Separate BARR PowerPoint Presentation